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I. INTRODUCTION

"[T]he outcome of a [criminal] case is usually determined long
before trial (or plea), that is, at the administrative investigation stages. If
truth and reliability are the objectives, therefore, what really must be
done is improve the quality of the evidence gathering and interpreting at
the initial investigation stages."'
This article aims to improve the quality of evidence gathering and
interpretation at one crucial phase of investigations: the evaluation of
The Fourth Amendment's warrant
search warrant applications.
1.

Keith A. Findley, Adversarial Inquisitions: Rethinking the Search for the Truth, 56

N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 911, 929 (2011/12).
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requirement is often portrayed as "the centerpiece of the law of search
and seizure, and pre-screening by neutral and detached magistrates is the
heart of citizens' protection against police overreaching." 2 While the
Supreme Court has expanded the exceptions to the warrant requirement
in recent years,3 the Court has nevertheless continued to emphasize the
importance of search warrants.4 Similarly, legal scholars have noted the
important function search warrants play in preventing police
overreaching and invasions of privacy.' Search warrants are particularly
valuable because they require an ex ante determination of the validity of
the search before the search occurs. This review prevents what happens
during the search from shading police testimony about what they knew
before the search, and it prevents the judge's opinion of the search from
being tainted by the police finding incriminating evidence. 6
As discussed below, the burgeoning literature on cognitive bias and
its effects on the criminal justice system support the value of ex ante
review of searches. Those who study wrongful convictions have come
to realize that "unintentional cognitive biases can play at least as large a
2. William J. Stuntz, Warrants and Fourth Amendment Remedies, 77 VA. L. REV. 881, 882
(1991).
3. See, e.g., Wayne D. Holly, The Fourth Amendment Hangs in the Balance: Resurrecting
the Warrant Requirement Through Strict Scrutiny, 13 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 531, 544 (1997)
("despite the Court's asserted preference for warrants, it is clear that its practice is fundamentally
inconsistent with its theory."). The precise contours of the debate over the validity of a warrant
preference and its possible contours are beyond the scope of this article.
4.
See, e.g., Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1856 (2011) (emphasizing the Fourth
Amendment principle that searches of homes without warrants are presumptively unreasonable
before discussing the exceptions to that rule). See also Messerschmidt v. Millender, 132 S. Ct.
1235, 1245 (2012) (reasoning search warrants obtained through a neutral magistrate and proper
procedure are the clearest indication the officers acted in an objectively reasonable manner for
purposes of qualified immunity).
5. Holly, supra note 3, at 553 ("The warrant therefore does not merely redress privacy
intrusions once suffered, but rather prevents such violations from occurring at all."). See also
Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 766 n.12 (1969) ("The [Fourth] Amendment is designed to
prevent, not simply to redress, unlawful police action.").
6. Stuntz, supra note 2, at 890 ("The essence of the warrant process lies ... in the timing of
the magistrate's decision. A judge in a suppression hearing decides whether the officer's past
conduct was legal. A magistrate reviewing a warrant application must decide whether a search is
legal before it takes place."); id. at 884 (noting the ways that knowledge of what happened in a
search can taint the suppression hearing). Stuntz also argues that requiring police to provide more
information to magistrates makes it harder for police to fabricate tips from informants. See id. at
930 ("the more information the officer puts in the affidavit, the harder it is to lie without taking a
serious risk that the lie will be uncovered later.").
7. For just a few examples of the recent scholarship on cognitive bias and the criminal
justice system, see, e.g., L. Song Richardson, Police Efficiency and the Fourth Amendment, 87 IND.
L.J. 1143, 1145 (2012); Anna Roberts, (Re)Forming the Jury: Detection and Disinfection oflmplicit
Juror Bias, 44 CONN. L. REV. 827 (2012); and Melanie D. Wilson, Quieting Cognitive Bias with
Standardsfor Witness Communications, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 1227 (2011).
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role in wrongful convictions as intentional prosecutorial misconduct."8
The term "cognitive bias" refers to errors in how we process or
remember information in ways that skew decision-making. 9 More
broadly, many legal scholars have turned to cognitive bias research to
provide a more nuanced understanding of human decision-making, the
law's utility in creating incentives, and penalties that can shape decisionmaking.' 0 This article therefore draws on cognitive bias research to
evaluate the incentives and penalties associated with the search warrant
process, with the goal of improving that process.
Cognitive bias research may well help explain the significant gap
between the pro-warrant rhetoric in the case law and the actual reality of
search warrant practice.' Yet the current case law on challenging the
adequacy of search warrant information is inadequate to provide a
meaningful remedy to the flaws identified below. In applying research
into cognitive biases such as implicit bias, tunnel vision, and hindsight
bias, this article proposes both doctrinal reform for challenges to search
warrant adequacy and changes in the way that the rules are applied in
certain cases. My aim in doing so is to help magistrates make better
decisions when reviewing search warrants by giving them full and
accurate information on which to base these decisions. The effects of
these changes may be difficult to measure in specific cases, but the goal
is to improve the search warrant process in the aggregate.12
8. Alafair Burke, Neutralizing Cognitive Bias: An Invitation to Prosecutors, 2 N.Y.U. J. L.
& LIBERTY 512, 515 (2007) [hereinafter Burke, Neutralizing Cognitive Bias].
9. Keith A. Findley & Michael S. Scott, The Multiple Dimensions of Tunnel Vision in
Criminal Cases, 2006 Wisc. L. REV. 291, 307 (2006). See also infra Part III for a discussion of the
various types of cognitive biases that may affect analysis of search warrant applications.
10. See generally Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science:
Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 1051 (2000).
But see Gregory Mitchell, Taking Behaviorism Too Seriously? The Unwarranted Pessimism of the
New Behavioral Analysis of the Law, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1907, 1936-37 (2002) (urging
skepticism about overly broad statements about "the manner in which all legal actors process
information, make judgments, and reach decisions" and arguing for a narrowing and more nuanced
use of psychological analysis of law).
I1. See Laurence A. Benner & Charles T. Samarkos, Searching for Narcotics in San Diego:
Preliminary Findings from the San Diego Search Warrant Project, 36 CAL. W. L. REV. 221, 222
(2000) (noting the gap between rhetoric and reality, and questioning whether the judiciary provides
meaningful enforcement of Fourth Amendment principles designed to protect individual privacy
and security).
12. I do not mean to suggest that cognitive biases will themselves be grounds for individual
litigation challenges, as the Supreme Court has been very clear in recent years that Fourth
Amendment issues are analyzed for objective reasonableness, without regard to individual intent.
See, e.g., Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2083 n.4 (2011) ("Efficient and evenhanded
application of the law demands that we look to whether the arrest is objectively justified, rather than
to the motive of the arresting officer."); Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 814 (1996) (holding
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In critiquing the state of the law regarding the search warrant
process, this article focuses in particular on search warrant applications
based on criminal informants' tips. 13 It does so because although the
overall use of warrants has declined considerably,14 studies suggest that
significant numbers of search warrants are based on information from
confidential informants.15 Understanding how informants contribute to
search warrants is crucial to understanding the reality of how search
warrants are crafted and evaluated. Furthermore, warrants based on
criminal informants' tips seem to have higher rates of inaccuracy than
other types of warrants.1 6
These inaccuracies can have grave
consequences, including innocent individuals being injured or killed
during the execution of the search warrants, 7 innocent individuals being
wrongfully convicted and imprisoned,' 8 and greater community mistrust
that objective reasonableness rather than the officer's subjective intent was key to validity of traffic
stop). But cognitive bias research is nevertheless valuable to identify what is actually happening, so
that solutions can be crafted more effectively to change decision-making as appropriate.
13. "Criminal informants" are involved in some way in criminal behavior and provide
information to police in exchange for some benefit, often relative leniency from their own crimes.
See ALEXANDRA NATAPOFF, SNITCHING: CRIMINAL INFORMANTS AND THE EROSION OF AMERICAN

JUSTICE 3 (2009) [hereinafter NATAPOFF, EROSION]. For a nuanced discussion of the distinctions

between types of informants, see Amanda Schreiber, Dealing with the Devil: An Examination of the
FBI's Troubled Relationship with Its Confidential Informants, 34 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 301,
303 (2001) (distinguishing between "cooperating defendants," " finformant defendants," and
"confidential informants," all within the general category of criminal informants).
14. See, e.g., Owen Bar-Gill & Barry Friedman, Taking Warrants Seriously, 106 NW. U. L.
REV. 1609, 1610-12 (2012) ("What was once a 'warrant requirement' is now a rule so laden with
exceptions that it best resembles a piece of Swiss cheese, a state of affairs increasingly accepted as
the new normal.").
15. See, e.g., Alexandra Natapoff, Snitching: The Institutionaland Communal Consequences,
73 U. CIN. L. REV. 645, 657 and nn. 56-57(2004) [hereinafter Natapoff, Snitching] (discussing
studies that show between 80 and 92 percent of search warrant applications are based on informant
tips). Use of informants varies significantly by jurisdiction, and some jurisdictions may rely less
heavily on informants for search warrant applications. See Craig D. Uchida & Timothy S. Bynum,
Search Warrants, Motions to Suppress and "Lost Cases:" The Effects of the Exclusionary Rule in
Seven Jurisdictions,81 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1034, 1055 (1991). Nevertheless, the existing

empirical data on search warrants suggests that informants play a significant role in many search
warrants, and as discussed infra, search warrants based on informants may be particularly likely to
be inaccurate.
16. See infra Part Ill.A.
17. See, e.g. NATAPOFF, EROSION, supra note 13, at I (ninety-two-year-old woman killed
during execution of a search warrant that was issued based on a tip from a criminal informant and
fabricated information from the police about a controlled buy confirming the tip); Benner &
Samarkos, supra note I1, at 223 (an unreliable informant's tip led to an unjustified shooting of a
Fortune 500 vice-president at his home during a nighttime raid in San Diego, leading to increased
scrutiny of the search warrant process in that area). Of course, individuals who have committed
crimes can also be killed or injured during the execution of valid search warrants, and their lives are
valuable as well.
18. See, e.g., NATAPOFF, EROSION, supra note 13, at 3-4 (discussing several examples,
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of police in general.' 9 Despite these risks, my prior work concluded that
courts fail to adequately scrutinize information from informants. 20 In
fact, the cognitive bias research paints an even bleaker picture of the
extent to which police, prosecutors, magistrates, and appellate judges all
lack the incentives to identify and challenge false information from
informants in search warrants. 2 1 Thus, while much of this article's
critique can apply to the search warrant process generally, the article
focuses in particular on warrants based on information from informants,
both because of the frequency of that type of warrant and because of the
particular risks posed by such warrants.
Part II of this article provides background on the search warrant
application process, including how courts evaluate such applications
based on informants' tips and how defendants can subsequently
challenge those decisions. Part III then discusses the ways in which
cognitive biases can affect each stage of the search warrant process. Part
IV provides my suggested solutions to the problems identified, all of
which fall under the general umbrella of full disclosure. That part
argues that education about cognitive biases will play a key role in
addressing the problems identified in the article. It also argues that
police should use a checklist to help ensure that they provide magistrates
with the necessary information to review the search warrant application,
and it suggests doctrinal reforms to incentivize use of this checklist.
These reforms are aimed at helping police and magistrates make better
decisions when search warrants are applied for and reviewed. They
should also help make the system more transparent, which in turn will
create greater roles for defense counsel in individual cases and help
scholars or others looking at systemic issues. Part V concludes the article
including an informant whose false tips led to several guilty pleas before a lie detector test showed
that the informant had lied and police discovered that the informant had mixed flour and baking
soda with small amounts of cocaine to fabricate evidence of drug deals); Hon. Steven S. Trott,
Words of Warning for Prosecutors Using Criminals as Witnesses, 47 Hastings L.J. 1381, 1383-85
(1996) (describing several examples of this problem); See also Andrew E. Taslitz, Wrongly Accused
Redux, How Race Contributes to Convicting the Innocent: the Informants Example, 37 SW. U. L.
REV. 1091 (2008) (discussing the risk of wrongful convictions based on informants' tips and the
difficulties in detecting this risk).
19. Id. at 1139-41 (discussing the creation of a culture of distrust and undermining
perceptions of law enforcement's legitimacy); Bar-Gill & Friedman, supra note 14, at 1628 (arguing
that damages are an inadequate remedy for wrongful searches, in part because the cost of the
psychic harms are incalculable: "It is undoubtedly difficult for most people even to comprehend the
trauma of having police officials burst into one's home . . . Victims describe the utter helplessness,
the feeling of freedom being taken away, the inability to trust cops thereafter.").
20. See generally Mary Nicol Bowman, Truth or Consequences: Self-Incriminating
Statements and Informant Veracity, 40 N. MEX. L. REV. 225 (2010).
21. See infra Part 1ll.
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by briefly summarizing the issue and recommending more empirical
research to verify some of the conclusions drawn throughout this article.
II. FOURTH AMENDMENT TREATMENT OF SEARCH WARRANTS

"The bulwark of Fourth Amendment protection, of course, is the
Warrant Clause, requiring that, absent certain exceptions, police obtain a
warrant from a neutral and disinterested magistrate before embarking
upon a search."22
The search warrant must be supported by
documentation, 23 typically an affidavit written by a police officer to be
understandable to laypeople.24 The affidavit must provide sufficient
detail to allow the magistrate to "make an independent evaluation of the
matter."25 The magistrate must then make that independent evaluation,
rather than merely ratifying conclusions of the officer who drafted the

affidavit. 2 6
This part provides an overview of the magistrates' role in
evaluating search warrant applications generally and introduces the role
of informant tips in search warrant evaluation. It then explains how
magistrates often fail to provide adequate review of these applications,
and how post-search judicial review does not provide an adequate
remedy for these problems.
A. Importance of the Magistrate'sRole in EvaluatingSearch Warrant
Applications
Both the courts and commentators generally stress the importance
of the magistrate's neutrality. For example, the Supreme Court has
repeatedly stated the Fourth Amendment protects individuals by
requiring "neutral and detached magistrates" to evaluate the inferences
from the facts uncovered by an investigation, rather than allowing those
inferences to be drawn "by the officer engaged in the often competitive
,,27
enterprise of ferreting out crime.
Magistrates play an important role

22. Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 164 (1978).
23. U.S. CONST. art. IV (providing that "no warrant shall issue, but on probable cause,
supported by oath or affirmation").
24. See Andrew E Taslitz, What Is Probable Cause, and Why Should We Care?: The Costs,
Benefits, and Meaning of IndividualizedSuspicion, 73 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 145, 178 (2010)
[hereinafter Taslitz, What Is Probable Cause].
25. Franks, 438 U.S. at 165.
26. See, e.g., Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 239 (1983).
27. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948) (quoted with approval relatively
recently in Grob v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 575 (2004) and more relevant to the topic of this article,
in Gates, 462 U.S. at 240).
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because of the inherent tension, or even incompatibility, between the
investigative and prosecutorial roles on the one hand, and a neutral
evaluation on the other.28 Requiring officers to justify their reasoning in
a search warrant application should provide transparency, accountability,
and error correction. 29
The magistrate's neutrality is particularly important because search
warrants are applied for and evaluated ex parte, i.e., without defense
counsel present.3 0 The subject of the search cannot be present or
represented by counsel at a search warrant hearing, to minimize the risk
of destruction or removal of evidence.3 1 However, the exparte nature of
the warrant process has important consequences: "The usual reliance of
our legal system on adversary proceedings itself should be an indication
that an ex parte inquiry is likely to be less vigorous. The magistrate has
no acquaintance with the information that may contradict the good faith
and reasonable basis of the affiant's allegations."32 At this stage, all the
power rests with the state,33 and the structure of the criminal justice
system incentivizes the state to focus on the interests of victims and
police, rather than on the vindication of truth.34 Therefore, it is essential
that magistrates play a meaningful role in scrutinizing the warrant
applications. For magistrates to provide meaningful scrutiny, however,
they must be provided with all the relevant information that they need to
exercise independent judgment. 35 That is, they must be provided with
28. Robert P. Mosteller, The Special Threat of Informants to the Innocent Who Are Not
Innocents: Producing "First Drafts," Recording Incentives, and Taking a Fresh Look at the
Evidence, 6 OHIO ST. J. OF CRIM. L. 519, 573 (2009).
29. Andrew E. Taslitz, Police Are People Too: Cognitive Obstacles to, and Opportunities
for, Police Getting the Individualized Suspicion Judgment Right, 8 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 7, 64
(2010) [hereinafter Taslitz, Police Are People Too].
30. See, e.g., Barbara O'Brien, Prime Suspect: An Examination of Factors that Aggravate
and Counteract Confirmation Bias in CriminalInvestigations, 15 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 315,
331 (2009) [hereinafter O'Brien, Prime Suspect] (identifying as a contributing factor to wrongful
convictions the fact that "defense attorneys typically do not begin working on cases as soon as

crimes are discovered; instead, they begin work only after the police and prosecutors have not only
identified but charged their clients.").
31. Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 169 (1978).
32. Id. See also Findley, supra note 1, at 914 ("The adversary system operates on the
fundamental belief that the best way to ascertain the truth is to permit adversaries to do their best to
prove their competing version of the facts. When two equal adversaries compete in this way, the
theory goes, falsehoods are exposed and the truth emerges.").
33. Id. (noting that "only the State typically has much ability to look for and produce the key
evidence in the case").
34. See Susan Bandes, Loyalty to One's Convictions: The Prosecutorand Tunnel Vision, 49
How. L.J. 475, 489 (2006).
35. See, e.g., 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT § 3.3, at n. 92-134 (4th ed. 2004) (discussing the level of detail about an informant's
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full disclosure. As used in this article, the term "full disclosure" means
all known information that can help magistrates make probable cause
determinations accurate and fair.36
B. Informants'Role in EstablishingProbable Cause
The need for full disclosure is particularly acute in situations
involving search warrants based on informants. 37 Informants are
frequently "highly motivated to help themselves" 38 and have substantial
motives to provide lies, rumors, or guesses to police in exchange for
reduced or eliminated liability for their own activities. 39 Some use of
informants may be a necessary evil, but the use of informants poses
significant challenges for adequate judicial oversight. 40
Historically, the courts used a two-pronged test to evaluate search
warrant applications based on information from informants.4 1 This
Aguilar-Spinelli test required that the affidavit demonstrate both the
informant's "basis of knowledge," i.e., the way the informant obtained
his or her information, 42 and the informant's "veracity. ,43 A deficiency
in the showing under either prong could be remedied through police
corroboration of some of the information provided.44 In 1983, however,
track record that should be provided to the magistrate to avoid the information being too
conclusory).
36. It is true that practically speaking, disclosure will never really be literally "full," in that
there may always be additional information that officers do not know that could be helpful, and I am
not proposing that officers be required to do additional investigation. See infra Part IV.B. But I use
the term "full disclosure," rather than "adequate" or "sufficient disclosure," to emphasize the
aspirational nature of my proposal, that officers and magistrates both need to think more broadly
about what information is relevant to probable cause determinations, and that officers need to
provide that information to magistrates in warrant applications, to help the magistrates make better
decisions in some cases.
37. See generally Bowman, supra note 20.
38. Mosteller, supra note 28, at 553-54. See also Natapoff, Snitching,supra note 15, at 652
(the criminal justice system's reliance on informants creates a "government-sponsored market in
betrayal and liability.").
39. See generally Bowman, supra note 20.
40. Id. at 669. Cf Ellen Yaroshefsky, Cooperationwith FederalProsecutors:Experiences of
Truth Telling and Embellishment, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 917, 936 (1999) (describing how much
more police officers who serve as informant "handlers" know about the informant than prosecutors
do, hampering the prosecutors' ability to make independent assessment of informants' credibility).
41. Bowman, supra note 20, at 229.
42. Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 113-14 (1964), overruled by Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S.
213, 238 (1983); Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 416 (1969), overruled by Gates, 462 U.S.
at 238.
43. Aguilar, 378 U.S. at 114-15; Spinelli, 393 U.S. at 416.
44. Cf Peter Erlinder, Floridav. J.L.- Withdrawing Permissionto "Lie With Impunity": The
Demise of "Truly Anonymous" Informants and the Resurrection of the Aguilar/Spinelli Test for
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the United States Supreme Court decided Illinois v. Gates, which
overruled Aguilar-Spinelli and replaced the two-pronged test with a
"totality of the circumstances analysis" to analyzing warrants based on
an informant's tip.4 5 Under Gates, the informant's basis of knowledge
and veracity are "closely intertwined issues that may usefully illuminate
the commonsense, practical question whether there is 'probable cause' to
believe that contraband or evidence is located in a particular place." 46 A
deficiency in the showing under one prong of the test may be
compensated for by a particularly strong showing under the other prong
of the test or even by some other showing of reliability. 47 Under Gates,
"[t]he task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a practical,
common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in
the affidavit before him, including the 'veracity' and 'basis of
knowledge' of persons supplying hearsay information, there is a fair
probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a
particular place." 48
Criminal procedure scholars have extensively criticized the Gates
decision, arguing that it provides significantly weaker protection than the
Aguilar-Spinelli test that it replaced. 49 A number of state courts have
rejected Gates and continue to apply Aguilar-Spinelli on state law
grounds.so Scholars disagree about both the normative value of the two
approaches (which is more faithful to Fourth Amendment principles)
and the empirical effects of each approach (which creates better
incentives for effective policing, however that term is defined).'
Regardless, both Aguilar-Spinelli and Gates, in different ways,
stress the important role played by magistrates. Aguilar-Spinelli and its
progeny stress giving complete information to magistrates.5 2 Gates, by
ProbableCause, 4 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1, 35 (2001) (prior to the decision in Gates, cases allowed
for corroboration to satisfy the basis of knowledge prong of Aguilar-Spinelli but should not have
been read, as they were, to satisfy the reliability prong as well).

45.

Gates, 462 U.S. at 230, 234.

46. Id. at 230.
47. Id. at 233.
48. Id. at 238.
49. See, e.g., LAFAVE, supra note 35, at 105-13 (extensively critiquing and refuting the
reasoning of the Gates majority). See also generally Erlinder, supra note 44, at 5 (providing a
particularly thorough discussion of the evolution of the law on probable cause determinations,
including the key role that magistrates play).
50. Bowman, supra note 20, at 231 n.38.
51. Taslitz, What Is Probable Cause, supranote 24, at 167-68.
52. See Aguilar, 378 U.S. at 111; Spinelli, 393 U.S. at 416. See also State v. Jackson, 688
P.2d 136, 139 (Wash. 1984) ("Underlying the Aguilar-Spinelli test is the basic belief that the
determination of probable cause to issue a warrant must be made by a magistrate, not law
enforcement officers who seek warrants.").
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contrast, stresses not burdening the magistrate with overly technical
rules, freeing the magistrate to make a commonsense determination of
probable cause.53 The Court in Gates also relied in part on the concern
that Aguilar-Spinelli created significant incentives for police to bypass
magistrates by avoiding getting a warrant and using consent or some
other warrant exception to justify the search ex post.54
Under either approach, magistrates must analyze a variety of factors
that can contribute to the probable cause determination. 55 Under either
test, it is crucial for the magistrate to scrutinize the information about the
informant, as "a court's unwillingness to seriously inquire into the
informant-handler relationship allows both the handler and the informant
to misrepresent or mischaracterize facts." 5 6
C. MagistratesFail to Provide Sufficient Review
Unfortunately, however, magistrates issuing search warrants and
courts reviewing defendants' challenges to those search warrants often
fail to provide this type of meaningful review. For example, an
empirical study of the search warrant process indicated that some
magistrates view their role as assisting law enforcement rather than
providing independent review.5 7
Similarly, studies show that
magistrates rarely deny search warrant applications,58 a factor that may
sometimes be influenced by police officers "judge-shopping," that is
"selecting the judge with whom an individual officer feels comfortable
or who is perceived as less likely to raise questions."59 In the same
study, magistrates admitted to being influenced, at least to some degree,
by the reputation for truthfulness of the officer seeking the warrant and
by the severity of the crime for which the warrant was sought; both
factors affected their level of scrutiny of the information in the

53. Gates, 462 U.S. at 235-36.
54. Id. at 236.
55. See LAFAVE, supra note 35, at 112.
56. Clifford S. Zimmerman, Toward a New Vision of Informants: A History of Abuses and
Suggestionsfor Reform, 22 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 81, 105 (1994).
57. See RICHARD VAN DUIZEND ET AL., THE SEARCH WARRANT PROCESS:
PRECONCEPTIONS, PERCEPTIONS, PRACTICES 47 (1985).
58. Id. See also Lauryn P. Gouldin, When Deference Is Dangerous: The Judicial Role in
Material-Witness Detentions, 49 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1333, 1369 and related text (2012) (discussing
how rarely federal warrants are denied, including noting that between 1999 and 2009, judges denied
only two of more than 18,000 applications for wiretap applications).
59. VAN DUIZEND ET AL., supranote 57, at 48. See also Benner & Samarkos, supra note I1,
at 223, 227-28.
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affidavit. 60 The study also showed that the review by the magistrate was
usually done very quickly, typically between two and three minutes per
warrant application. 61
Furthermore, despite the repeated emphasis in the case law for the
need to provide specific information rather than boilerplate language to
the magistrates, empirical studies show that magistrates tend to accept
these boilerplate recitations as sufficient. 62 For example, in one of the
jurisdictions studied, every warrant application involving a confidential
informant contained the same boilerplate language about the reasons for
keeping the informant's identity confidential.
In another jurisdiction,
the warrant applications routinely stated that the informant had provided
reliable information "on at least two prior occasions" and that "to the
knowledge of the affiant, this informant has never supplied your affiant
with information that was proven to be false."64 The study correctly
notes the dangers inherent in overreliance on boilerplate language: "one
of the more insidious qualities of boilerplate presentations is that the
affiant (officer) may take them only half-seriously, as part of the game
that must be played, as form rather than substance." 65
Affidavits are often drafted to reveal as little information as
possible. Officers in one study acknowledged that they deliberately
provided the minimum amount of information necessary to establish
probable cause, to minimize later attacks by defense counsel.
Similarly, some officers provided minimal data on the informant's past
reliability, perhaps to protect the identity of the informant. 67 One study

60. VAN DUIZEND ET AL., supra note 57, at 48-49.
61. Id. at 49. But see Bar-Gill & Friedman, supra note 14, at 1672-73 (questioning whether
reports of magistrates "rubber-stamping" search warrant applications and police engaging in
"magistrate-shopping" are accurate).
62. VAN DUIZEND ET AL., supra note 57, at 51-53. See also id. at 52-53 (offering one
magistrate's perspective that he needed to make sure all the necessary boilerplate language was
included "because once in a while the typist will leave something out"). This description suggests
that both the officer and the magistrate are more focused on form over substance, contrary to the
Supreme Courts' directives about meaningful magistrate review.
63. Id. at 52.
64. Id. See also Benner & Samarkos, supra note 11, at 239 (discussing use of boilerplate
language regarding the need to keep the informant's identity confidential); id. at 242 (noting that
affidavits tended to discuss arrests but not convictions when documenting the informant's "track
record;" no discussion of countervailing times in which the informant's information was
inaccurate).
65. VAN DUIZEND ET AL., supranote 57, at 52-53.
66. Id. at 53 ("We were told in [three cities] that affidavits are drafted to include the
minimum amount of information necessary to establish probable cause, in order to limit the avenues
of attack by the defense and to protect the identity of the informants.").
67. Id. at 54.
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even found that half of the affidavits studied that included information
from a confidential informant were written so that no officer had to
swear that the confidential informant even existed; instead, the affiant
officer stated that another officer told him about information from the
confidential informant. 68 Although lawyers often draft documents to
reveal as little as possible to the opposing side, that practice here
contradicts the directives in case law that magistrates rather than officers
should evaluate the inferences from the facts to determine whether
probable cause exists,69 which can only occur if magistrates are given
adequate information.
D. LaterReview by Trial and Appellate Courts Is Also Inadequate
As noted above, search warrants are issued ex parte, so defendants
cannot challenge the validity of the search warrant until after it has been
executed. Both doctrine and practice, however, seriously limit the value
of these later challenges, which can take two different forms.
First, criminal defendants can accept as true the information in the
search warrant application but argue that it fails to establish probable
cause. Those challenges are typically litigated as suppression motions in
the criminal case, 70 and they turn on the courts' interpretation of
probable cause. Unfortunately, courts often rely on "somewhat vapid
generalizations as universal principles" when analyzing probable cause
based on informants' stories.72 Courts often fail to look skeptically at
other information presented by police,73 and they fail to demand full
disclosure of information relevant to the probable cause analysis. 74
68. Benner & Samarkos, supra note 11, at 24I (noting that the practice has been upheld but
that it would be preferable to require the officer with first-hand knowledge to prepare the affidavit,
perhaps by seeking a telephonic warrant to alleviate timing concerns).
69. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 240 (1983). Scholars in other contexts have similarly
criticized reviewing courts for failing to demand sufficient information, such as information about
cooperation in material witness warrants in the post-9/11 age. See Gouldin, supra note 58, at 135253 and related text.
70. See, e.g., Gates, 462 U.S. at 216-17. As discussed in Part 11.B above, for tips from
informants, most courts apply the Gates "totality of the circumstances" analysis to determining
probable cause, while a few states continue to apply the two-pronged Aguilar-Spinelli test.
71. Probable cause is a complex concept that has been the subject of much scholarly analysis.
See, e.g., Taslitz, What Is ProbableCause, supra note 24. As noted earlier, many scholars have
been quite critical of whether the courts are adequately rigorous in making probable cause
determinations, particularly in cases involving information from informants. The contours of those
debates are outside the scope of this article.
72. Id. at 153.
73. Id.
74. For example, in Truth or Consequences, I argue that courts analyzing suppression
motions have not been sufficiently rigorous in analyzing probable cause in that they have relied too
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Even more troubling, however, are the failures of the second line of
attack on search warrants, where defendants more directly contest the
quantity and quality of the information provided. Defendants can bring
"Franks challenges" to contest the accuracy or completeness of the
information in search warrant applications.7 ' These challenges come
from Franks v. Delaware, in which the Supreme Court concluded that it
"would be an unthinkable imposition upon [the magistrate's] authority if
a warrant affidavit, revealed after the fact to contain a deliberately or
recklessly false statement," could not be challenged later by the
defendant.76 Therefore, under Franks, defendants can challenge the
accuracy of information provided in support of search warrants, at least
in limited circumstances.
Franks challenges concerning affidavits
based on informants' tips are almost impossible to win, based on both
the structure of the Franks test and the ways courts apply the test in
cases involving omitted information about informants.
heavily on informants' statements against penal interest in establishing their reliability. See
generally Bowman, supranote 20. 1argued instead that they should consider a number of factors in
determining whether those statements against interests really support the informant's credibility.
Courts can only perform that analysis, however, if they are given full disclosure, i.e. if the
documents supporting the search warrant application provide sufficient information about the
various issues that should affect the magistrate's analysis of the informant's credibility. Too often,
the courts fail to demand such information from police.
75. See generally LAFAVE, supra note 35, sec. 4.4, at 531-32. See also Franks v. Delaware,
438 U.S. 154, 165 (1978) (requiring that the information in a search warrant affidavit must
"'truthful' in the sense that the information put forth is believed or appropriately accepted by the
affiant as true.").
76. Id. See also id. at 168 ("The requirement that a warrant not issue "but upon probable
cause, supported by Oath or affirmation," would be reduced to a nullity if a police officer was able
to use deliberately falsified allegations to demonstrate probable cause, and, having misled the
magistrate, then was able to remain confident that the ploy was worthwhile.").
77. See, e.g., Franks, 438 U.S. at 167 (noting that "the rule announced today has a limited
scope, both in regard to when exclusion of the seized evidence is mandated, and when a hearing on
allegations of misstatements must be accorded.").
78. The application of the Franks doctrine to affidavits based on confidential informants has
always been somewhat challenging. The Franks case itself did not involve information provided by
a confidential informant. See Franks, 438 U.S. at 156-58. The Court only made fleeting mention of
informants in its decision. See, e.g., id. at 165 (noting that the "truthfulness" of the information
supporting a search warrant application must take into account the fact that affidavits often include
hearsay, information gathered from an informant, and information gathered hastily during an
investigation). The Court expressly reserved the "difficult question" of whether an informant's
identify could ever be required to be disclosed after "a substantial preliminary showing of falsity has
been made." Id. at 170. Furthermore, at the end of the opinion, in explaining the various limitations
on the rules the Court was announcing, the court noted that "[t]he deliberate falsity or reckless
disregard whose impeachment is permitted today is only that of the affiant, not of any
nongovernmental informant." Id. at 171. As discussed in more detail below, the language in
Franks about informants foreshadowed the difficulties that the lower courts would have in applying
the doctrine to the factual and legal issues surrounding informant usage.
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1. The Franks Standards Are Nearly Impossible to Meet for Search
Warrants Based on Informants' Tips
Franks challenges involve heavy burdens for defendants to meet,
even at the earliest stages. First, the defendant must make "a substantial
preliminary showing that a false statement knowingly and intentionally,
or with reckless disregard for the truth, was included by the affiant in the
warrant affidavit." 79 A defendant's claim will fail if it only alleges
innocent or negligent misrepresentation; it will similarly fail if the
court determines that the evidence fails to demonstrate falsity.8 ' At this
stage, the defendant must also show that "the allegedly false statement is
necessary to the finding of probable cause."82 Many Franks challenges
fail at this stage because the court determines that the allegedly false
statement is not important enough to affect the probable cause analysis.83
If the defendant's "preliminary showing" clears all three of these hurdles
(falsity, intent, and materiality), then the defendant is entitled to a
hearing on the allegations. 8 4 At the evidentiary hearing, the defendant
has to establish by a preponderance of the evidence the same three
things; only then will the evidence be suppressed "to the same extent as
if probable cause was lacking on the face of the affidavit."8 5 Reviewing
courts presume the affidavit's validity and require the defendant to
provide specific allegations and an offer of proof.86
As applied to affidavits based on informants' tips, these standards
are nearly impossible for defendants to meet. First, the officer, rather
than the informant, has to be the one to make the false statement.87 So
long as the affiant reasonably believed the informant's story, then the
informant's inaccuracy does not matter under Franks.88 Although some
courts say that the defendant can obtain a Franks hearing by showing
"that the officer submitting the [affidavit] . . . acted recklessly because

he seriously doubted or had obvious reasons to doubt the truth of the
allegations,"8 9 most courts rarely question whether it was reasonable for
79. Id. at 155-56.
80. Id. at 171 ("Allegations of negligence or innocent mistake are insufficient.").
81. See id. at155-56.
82. Id. at 156.
83. See, e.g., United States v. Croto, 570 F.3d 11, 15 (1st Cir. 2009); United States v.
Charles, 138 F.3d 257, 264 (6th Cir. 1998).
84. Franks, 438 U.S. at 155-56.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 171.
87. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 580 F.3d 666, 670 (7th Cir. 2009).
88. United States v. Rodriguez-Suazo, 346 F.3d 637, 648 (6th Cir. 2003).
89. Johnson, 580 F.3d at 670.
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the officer to rely on the informant's information.9 0 Instead, they tend to
defer to the officer, even when the facts suggest grounds for
skepticism.91
Furthermore, when officers draft affidavits to protect the identities
of confidential informants, defendants often lack access to the very
information they would need to make the required preliminary showing
of falsity, intent, and materiality. Courts often reject claims that the
prosecution should have to disclose the identity of the informant in order
to allow the defendant the opportunity to make the necessary preliminary
showing. 92 Yet as one district court forthrightly noted, "[i]t is difficult
to imagine how [someone raising a Franks claim] could hope to make
the substantial showing necessary . .. without at least some access to the
confidential informant." 93
These standards can even be used to shield police who make up the
informant entirely. 94 "If an informant's identity-or very existence-is
unknown, a defendant obviously lacks the very information necessary to
determine the source of the false statements." 95 Therefore, the courts
create an impossible burden when they require a defendant to disprove
every possibility besides the officer making intentionally or recklessly
false statements just to get a hearing. This burden effectively "enable[s]
the officer to insulate perjury from discovery by the simple expedient of
a fabricated informant." 96
Although the picture is bleak in most jurisdictions, a few
jurisdictions have recognized the real difficulties imposed by these
standards in informant cases. 97 For example, the First Circuit explicitly
90. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 208 F.3d 603, 607 (7th Cir. 2000); United States v.
Akinkoye, 185 F.3d 192, 198-99 (4th Cir. 1999).
91. See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 3 F.3d 673, 676-78 (3d Cir. 1993) (defendant's Franks
motion factual showing significantly undercut the informant's story, and the officer's writing of the
affidavit contained other inaccuracies, which should undercut the deference shown to the officer,
but the court affirmed the trial court's refusal to grant a Franks hearing). Even when courts do grant
a hearing in these circumstances, they still tend to defer to the officer's statements even when the
facts suggest reasonable grounds for skepticism. See, e.g., State v. KIlar, 400 So. 2d 610, 612-13 (La.
1981) (court accepted testimony of affiant rather than defendant, informant, and other witnesses).
92. See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 3 F.3d 673, 679-80 (3d Cir. 1993) (disclosure of
informant's identity under Franks only required after defendant makes substantial preliminary
showing).
93. Rodriguez v. City of Springfield, 127 F.R.D. 426, 429 (D. Mass. 1989).
94. See, e.g., People v. Lucente, 506 N.E.2d 1269, 1275 (Ill. 1987).
95. Id.
96. Id. Of course, if police fabricate the existence of an informant in support of a search
warrant application, that would be intentional wrongdoing rather than the result of cognitive bias.
97. See, e.g., United States v. Higgins, 995 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1993); United States v.
Manning, 79 F.3d 212. 220 (1st Cir. 1996). See also Lucente, 506 N.E.2d at 1275-76 (collecting
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grants discretion to its trial courts to order an in-camera hearing to test
the credibility of the officer-affiant, and even the informant."
In
justifying its decision to allow for in-camera questioning of the officer in
the case about the informant's identity and information, the court noted
that "[i]nformants may have many motives for misleading the police,
and even the most conscientious officer may be tempted to wink at the
improprieties of an informant. If the court is going to be honest about the
realities of law enforcement in this area, the risk of abuse must be
confronted." 99
2. Franks Is Even Harder to Meet in Omissions Cases
Although Franks dealt with affirmatively false statements, lower
courts have logically extended the doctrine to apply to "material
omissions," i.e., omissions of information that would be material to the
court's analysis.100 After all, significant omissions of information can
mislead magistrates who rely on the government to "present the full case
for its belief in probable cause, including any contraindications."' 0
Many Franks challenges regarding material omissions deal with
omissions of information regarding informants.102
However, some circuits state explicitly that "there is a higher bar
for obtaining a Franks hearing [based on] an allegedly material omission
as opposed to an allegedly false affirmative statement."'03 These courts
justify the "higher bar" for omissions cases by citing concerns about
"endless" Franks litigation about what might have benefited the
defendant,'1 even though that does not seem to be a realistic fear given
how hard other Frankschallenges are to win.
But the line between omissions and affirmative misstatements is
often a very fine one. 0 5 For example, the Eighth Circuit concluded that
other state court cases).
98. Manning, 79 F.3d at 220.
99. Rodriguez, 127 F.R.D. at 430.
100. LAFAVE, supra note 34, sec. 4.4, at n.48 and accompanying text.
101. United States v. Nelson-Rodriguez, 319 F.3d 12, 33 (1st Cir. 2003).
102. See, e.g., United States v. Croto, 570 F.3d 11, 15 (1st Cir. 2009) (defendant argued that
information regarding informant bias should have been included in the affidavit); United States v.
Trujillo, 376 F.3d 593, 602 (6th Cir. 2004) (defendant argued she should have been entitled to a
Franks hearing because affidavit failed to include informants' previous explanations and allegations
regarding who else was involved in drug distribution).
103. See, e.g., United States v. Fowler, 535 F.3d 408, 415 (6th Cir. 2008).
104. See, e.g., United States v. Atkin, 107 F.3d 1213, 1217 (6th Cir. 1997); United States v.
Colkley, 899 F.2d 297, 301 (4th Cir. 1990); United States v. Owens, 882 F.2d 1493, 1498-99 (10th
Cir. 1989); United States v. Reivich, 793 F.2d 957, 961 (8th Cir. 1986).
105. See LAFAVE, supra note 35, at sec. 4.4 notes 70-71 and accompanying text.
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"[s]tating that an informant has not given false information even though
he has never given information in the past does not amount to a false or
reckless omission of relevant information." 06 But the court could have,
and probably should have, considered that a false statement, not an
omission, as the defendant challenged the accuracy of a specific
statement in the affidavit rather than the failure to include any
information on a topic.1'
This classification matters because an
affidavit with "knowing falsehoods in it ... should not be open to
rehabilitation by a process of substituting for the affiant's lies other
information which is really the truth from which he deliberately
departed."' 0 8
Additionally, courts routinely reject the significance of information
about informants that defendants allege should have been included. For
example, courts routinely reject as insufficient defendants' claims that
the affidavit should have included information about the informant's
bias or motive to lie.109 Similarly, courts routinely reject claims that the
affidavit should have addressed the informant's deal with police, to
provide information in exchange for some benefit, like leniency"l 0 or
payment."' As I explained in my prior article, however, these matters
are highly relevant to analyzing the informant's reliability, which is part
of the overall probable cause analysis." 2
106. United States v. Underwood, 364 F.3d 956, 964 (8th Cir. 2004) cert. granted, judgment
vacated sub nom. Carpenter v. United States, 543 U.S. 1108 (2005) (on other grounds).
107. See Underwood, 364 F.3d at 964.
108. LAFAVE, supra note 35, at see. 4.4, at 552.
109. See, e.g., United States v. Croto, 570 F.3d II, 15 (1st Cir. 2009) (defendant claimed
informants were biased against him because they were tired of him selling marijuana); State v.
Lease, 472 S.E. 2d 59, 62-63 (La. 1996) (omission of fact that informant was extremely agitated
because of her desire to remove her child from the home of the defendant, the child's father, was not
fatal to validity of the warrant).
110. See, e.g., United States v. Allen, 297 F.3d 790, 795 (8th Cir. 2002) ("search warrant
affidavits need not provide judicial officers with all the details of bargaining between police and
arrested persons from whom they are seeking to get information"); United States v. Legualt, 323 F.
Supp. 2d 217, 226 (D. Mass 2004) (defendant argued affidavit should have included information re.
favorable bail conditions informant received in exchange for information; court found that would
have "enhanced her credibility rather than weakened it because it provides an incentive to give
accurate information); State v. Grimshaw, 515 A.2d 1201, 1203-04 (N.H. 1986) (omission of fact
that charges against informant were dropped in exchange for information did not matter because the
magistrate was informed that the informant had been arrested).
Ill. United States v. Muldoon, 931 F.2d 282, 286 (4th Cir. 1991) (while evidence that
informant and his wife were paid had "some bearing on [the informant's] credibility," omitting that
information from the affidavit was not fatal to probable cause because of the other evidence against
the defendant); State v. Garberding, 801 P.2d 583, 586 (Mont. 1990) (omission of fact that
informant was paid for information was not material because it did not cast doubt on the informant's
reliability).
112. See Bowman, supra note 20, at Part 11I.C.4, regarding how courts should analyze
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Thus, despite the language in case law and scholarship about the
importance of magistrate review of search warrant applications, there are
significant flaws in the actual practices related to search warrants, from
their preparation and issuance through judicial review. While some of
these problems may come from deliberate choices by police officers,
magistrates, and judges, recent research into cognitive biases suggests
another possible explanation for these failings.'" 3 This research suggests
that many of the errors in the criminal justice system result not from
maliciousness or even indifference, but from the combination of human
cognitive limits and institutional pressures.' 4 The next part describes
that cognitive bias research and how it sheds light on each stage of the
search warrant process.
III. COGNITIVE BIAS LIKELY AFFECTS EACH STAGE OF THE SEARCH
WARRANT PROCESS

Social science research over the last few decades has compellingly
shown that "human decision makers are imperfect utility-maximizers
and suffer systematically from a series of cognitive biases."'Is As noted
above, cognitive bias means errors in how we process or remember
information that skew decisions in a predictable direction.11 6 Research
suggests that the way the human mind works poses obstacles to good

informants' motivations when assessing the informants' reliability. Specifically, informants'
motives the informants' motives can directly undercut that reliability determination, in that their
motives may lead them to provide rumors, guesses, or deliberately false information if they believe
that such information will not be held against them if it proves to be incorrect.
113. Cf Susan Bandes, Framing Wrongful Convictions, 2008 UTAH L. REv. 5, 19-23
(discussing the tension in trying to motivate reform between focusing on and labeling individual
intentional conduct versus focusing on and highlighting structural and institutional factors that
contribute to wrongful convictions and procedural injustice). I similarly try to keep the focus in this
article on wrongs that could be caused by cognitive bias rather than intentional wrongdoing,
although the line between the two can sometimes be fine, and it is sometimes helpful to explore how
the two can be closely connected.
114. Findley & Scott, supra note 9, at 307.
115. Alafair Burke, ProsecutorialPassion, Cognitive Bias, and Plea Bargaining,91 MARQ. L.
REV. 183, 195 (2007) [hereinafter Burke, ProsecutorialPassion].
116. See Findley & Scott, supra note 9, at 307-08. See also id. at n.9 ("In some contexts,
biases may be desirable when they run in the direction of errors that are less costly than their
opposites."). Some authors use the term "bounded rationality" rather than "cognitive bias" to refer
to these limits on our ability to process and remember information. See, e.g., Christine Jolls, Cass
R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV.
1447 (1998).
Both these terms highlight different aspects of the problem, with "bounded
rationality" highlighting the flaws in expecting perfect rationality from people. However, I have
chosen to use the term "cognitive bias" because it is more commonly used in the legal literature and
it emphasizes the way that decisions can be skewed.
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decision-making, but poor decision-making is not inevitable."' This
research "does not absolve actors in the criminal justice system from
responsibility" but instead "demands that we become aware of these
cognitive processes ... and that we search for ways to neutralize
them."'"8 Unfortunately, both structural features of the criminal justice
system and policy choices within it exacerbate rather than mitigate
cognitive biases." 9
These features and choices likely affect the search warrant process
in a number of ways, as described below. Specifically, implicit bias
likely affects who police target for searching. Police preparing warrants
may be affected by tunnel vision. Magistrate review may be affected by
framing, priming, and implicit biases. In addition, post-search review
may be particularly affected by confirmation and hindsight biases.
A. Implicit Bias Likely Affects Who Is Targetedfor Searching
Much of the recent literature applying social science research has
focused on implicit bias.120 The foundational article on the subject
defined implicit biases as "discriminatory biases based on implicit
attitudes or implicit stereotypes."121 As the name suggests, implicit
biases involve unconscious rather than conscious mental processes; these
unconscious processes allow implicit attitudes to affect decision-making
unnoticed.122 Thus, implicit bias "can produce behavior that diverges
from a person's avowed or endorsed beliefs or principles." 23
Although implicit bias can involve other types of disadvantaged

117. See, e.g., Andrew J. Wistrich, Chris Guthrie & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Can Judges Ignore
Inadmissible Information? The Difficulty of Deliberately Disregarding,153 U. PA. L. REV. 1251,
1292 (2005) ("As with all of our results, the data suggest potential obstacles to good decision
making, more so than providing definitive evidence of poor decision making.").
118. Findley & Scott, supra note 9, at 322.
119. Id. at 322.
120. See, e.g., Roberts, supra note 7; Hon. John F. Irwin & Daniel L. Real, Unconscious
Influences on Judicial Decision-Making: The Illusion of Objectivity, 42 MCGEORGE L. REV. 1, 3
(2010); and Anthony Greenwald & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Implicit Bias: Scientific Foundations,
94 CALIF. L. REV. 945, 951 (2006).

121.
Greenwald &Krieger, supra note 120, at 951.
122. Irwin & Real, supranote 120, at 3.
123. Id. See also Greenwald & Krieger, supra note 120, at 954-55 (arguing that "implicit
measures of bias have relatively greater predictive validity than explicit measures in situations that
are socially sensitive, like racial interactions, where impression-management processes might
inhibit people from expressing negative attitudes or unattractive stereotypes."); Robert J. Smith &
Justin D. Levinson, The Impact of Implicit Racial Bias on the Exercise of ProsecutorialDiscretion,
35 SEATILE U. L. REV. 795, 803 (2012) (noting that "the IAT's popularity among scholars as a
symbol of inequality may be traced to its success in predicting the way people make decisions.").
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groups, such as gender or age,124 much of the application to the criminal
justice system has focused on race. Research shows that despite our best
intentions, we often classify information about people in racially biased
ways. 125 The magnitude of the results for race-based implicit bias is
striking: "with one notable exception, the percentage of respondents who
display implicit race bias varies relatively little across groups
categorized by varied age, sex, and educational attainment. African
Americans constitute the only subgroup of respondents who do not show
substantial implicit pro-[European-American] race bias" on the major
assessment tool for detecting implicit bias.126 Judges are not immune
from this race-based implicit bias; a study of judges demonstrated a
similarly strong level of implicit bias. 127 These implicit biases can lead
people to discriminate against African Americans even when that is
contrary to one's conscious commitments. 12 8
Implicit bias may affect the search warrant process in a number of
ways, primarily connected with who is targeted for searching. The San
Diego Search Warrant study, 12 9 which is the best current source of
empirical evidence on these issues, showed that that Whites were
significantly under-represented while Blacks and Hispanics were
significantly over-represented as targets of narcotics search warrants
compared to the population of the county as a whole.1 30 Similarly,
124. See Greenwald & Krieger, supra note 120, at 955 ("Second, the IAT measures
consistently revealed greater bias in favor of the relatively advantaged group (averaging almost
three-quarters of respondents across all the topics) than did the explicit measures (for which an
average of slightly over one-third of respondents showed bias favoring advantaged groups))."
125. Smith & Levinson, supra note 123, at 797.
126. Greenwald & Krieger, supra note 120, at 956.
127. Jeffrey J. Rachlinski et al., Does Unconscious Bias Affect Trial Judges?, 84 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1195, 1210-11 (2009) (noting that white judges displayed "a statistically
significantly stronger white preference than that observed among a sample of white subjects
obtained" through administration of the test on the Internet, while Black judges' IAT scores were
comparable to the scores of Blacks obtained on the Internet). See id. at 1211 (offering reasons why
the statistically significant difference did not necessarily mean that White judges harbored "more
intense White preferences than the general population").
128. Id. at 1197.
129. The San Diego Search Warrant Study began over concerns about innocent citizens being
injured or killed because of being erroneously targeted for drug raids conducted based on search
warrants. Laurence A. Benner, Racial Disparity in Narcotics Search Warrants, 6 J. GENDER RACE
& JUST. 183, 184-85 (2002). The results of that study were published in two articles, one in the
Journal of Gender, Race, and Justice, id., and the other in the California Western Law Review,
Benner & Samarkos, supra note I1. More empirical research is needed on search warrants. See
Taslitz, Wrongly Accused Redux, supra note 18, at 1131 n.279.
130. Benner, supra note 129, at 215 (Whites made up nearly two-thirds of the county's
population but only thirty-five percent of search warrant targets; Blacks made up six percent of
county population and twenty percent of search warrant targets; Hispanics were twenty-four percent
of county population and forty-three percent of search warrant targets). See also id. at 194 (forty-
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narcotics search warrant applications were frequently targeted at
minority areas of San Diego while only three percent of the search
warrant applications targeted a largely White suburban area. 131
Some of these racial disparities may stem from explicit racial bias,
but it seems likely that implicit racial bias plays a very significant
role.13 2 Professor Andrew Taslitz uses the term "subconscious profiling"
to describe the implicit bias concept that "even consciously wellmeaning, anti-racist officers nevertheless find themselves drawn to black
skin as an indicator of criminality."' 3 3 Whether racial profiling is done
consciously or subconsciously, however, the effect is the same, in that
police focus more attention on Blacks than Whites and therefore find
more evidence of crimes committed by Blacks rather than Whites.' 34
This leads to a "ratchet effect," where police devote even more resources
to the group that seems to be offending at higher rates, and thereby
discover even more crime, creating a self-fulfilling prophecy with racial
effects even without racial animus.135
The racial disparity in targeting cannot be attributed to a higher
success rate for searches of minorities, as the empirical data showed that
the opposite was true. Although minority areas and suspects were more
frequently targeted, the searches of White targets were far more
successful than the searches of either Black or Hispanic targets in
turning up the drug sought by the warrant.' 36 Taslitz noted that this data
"should direct police resources toward white suspects as a more efficient
target for maximizing the success of searches," even though that did not
five percent of the county population was non-white, but eighty-one percent of the search warrants
for narcotics targeted non-Whites, while Blacks and Hispanics together made up less than a third of
the county population but more than eighty percent of the narcotics search warrant targets).
131. Id. at 190.
132. Both Professor Benner, the study's author, and Professor Andrew Taslitz conclude that
this data suggested that there was at least some level of implicit bias leading to the increased
targeting of minority rather than White residents in these search warrant applications. See id. at
223-24; Taslitz, Wrongly Accused Redux, supra note 18, at 1099, 1125.
133. Id. at 1099.
134. See id.
135. Id.atlll4.
136. Benner, supra note 129, at 203 ("Over half (53%) of the warrants targeting Whites were
successful. However, little more than one third (36%) of the warrants targeting Hispanics and only
about one in four (28%) of the warrants targeting Blacks resulted in discovery of the drug sought by
the warrant."). See also id. at 219 ("Over two-thirds (69%) of all warrants targeting Whites
recovered their target. However, less than half of the warrants targeting Hispanic suspects and less
than one-third (32%) of the warrants targeting Black suspects were successful in recovering their
targets."). The article does not explain the difference in these two sets of figures, although it may
have to do with how the authors treated warrants that were not executed. Compare id at n.25
(breaking the results into successful, unsuccessful, and unexecuted warrants) with id. at n.96
(discussing the high percentage of warrants issued against Black targets that were never executed).
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happen. 137 Instead, police seemed to make decisions about where to
devote resources based on their perceptions of "where they perceive the
work is," and those perceptions may well have been influenced by
implicit racial bias.' 3 8
The use of confidential informants can exacerbate implicit racial
bias. In attempting to explain the findings described above about racial
disparities, Professor Benner discussed the connection between
confidential informants and race: "Because every racial group has drug
users and sellers among them, if Blacks and Hispanics are stopped on
the street disproportionately to their percentage of the population, this
could be expected to produce a disproportionate number of Black and
The article then detailed findings that
Hispanic informants."' 3 9
confirmed the disproportionate number of stops for Black and Hispanic
drivers as compared to White drivers, and the higher incidences of
vehicle searches for these groups as compared to White drivers.14 0
The racial disparity in informant usage may play some role in
accounting for the differential success rates between the White and
minority defendants targeted. Search warrants targeting minority inner
city zip codes often involved anonymous tips, but only twenty-seven
percent of the warrants initiated by an anonymous tip led to a successful
search.141 Confidential informants were often used in these inner-city
cases, including to confirm information from the anonymous tip,14 2
although the study did not provide information about success rates when
confidential criminal informants were used.14 3
Taslitz suggests,
however, that the use of confidential informants may contribute to lower
success rates than those for search warrants based on other types of
information because "many of the confidential informants' tips are from

137. Taslitz, Wrongly Accused Redux, supra note 18, at 1125-26.
138. Benner, supra note 129, at 223-24.
139. Id. at 201. See also Taslitz, Wrongly Accused Redux, supra note 18, at 1145 ("Snitches
snitch on those they know, and since the police disproportionately focus on racial minorities as the
pool from which to recruit snitches, snitches tend to snitch on other persons who belong to similar
racial minorities.").
140. Benner, supra note 129, at 201. See also Kevin R. Johnson, The Case for African
American and Latina/o Cooperation in Challenging Racial Profiling in Law Enforcement, 55 FLA.
L. REV. 341, 344 (2003) (citing studies showing that blacks, Latinos, and Asians are stopped
approximately eight to ten times as whites in some jurisdictions).
141. Benner, supra note 129, at 203.
142. Id. at 200.
143. See id. at 200-01. The police do not know the identities of truly anonymous informants,
Bowman, supra note 20, at 258, while they do know and actively protect the identities of
confidential informants, many of whom fall within the category of criminal informants who can
continue to engage in criminal activities while providing information to the police, id. at 227-28.
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drug users caught in the act and seeking police incentives in exchange
for information, the sort of deal [that is] . . . likely to produce false tips

free of the fear of discovery via cross-examination precisely because the
informant's identity is kept 'confidential.' 144
B. Police PreparingWarrantApplications Are Likely Affected by Tunnel
Vision
Police are unlikely to recognize the role that implicit bias may play
in their selection of search warrant targets and information sources, in
part because of a phenomenon commonly referred to as "tunnel
vision."1 4 5 "Tunnel vision" is essentially a filter through which people
understand information, in this context information from police
investigations.146 Tunnel vision can profoundly shape investigations and

prosecutions:147
Investigators focus on a suspect, select and filter the evidence that will
"build a case" for conviction, while ignoring or suppressing evidence
that points away from guilt. This drive to confirm a preconceived belief in guilt adversely impacts . . . witness interviews, eyewitness procedures, interrogation of suspects, and the management of informers in
ways that have been identified in virtually all known cases of wrongful
conviction.148

It is helpful to look at the different types of cognitive biases that make
up tunnel vision before examining their effect on the preparation of

144. Taslitz, Wrongly Accused Redux, supranote 18, at 1225-26. See also id. at 1107 (arguing
that "proportionately more blacks than whites will face the risks of an innocent man being fingered
by a lying or mistaken tipster that are inherent in reliance on informants.").
145. See, e.g., Findley & Scott, supra note 9, at 317-19; Dianne L. Martin, Lessons About
Justicefrom the "Laboratory" of Wrongful Convictions: Tunnel Vision, the Construction of Guilt
and Informer Evidence, 70 UMKC L. REV. 847, at 849 (2002).
146. Findley & Scott, supra note 9, at 292. As described below, tunnel vision can affect
prosecutors, magistrates, and even reviewing judges as well.
147.
BRUCE A. MACFARLANE, WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS: THE EFFECT OF TUNNEL VISION
AND PREDISPOSING CIRCUMSTANCES IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 20, 34, 45 (2008),

availableat http://www.attomeygeneral.jus.gov.on.ca/inquiries/goudge/policy-research/pdf/
MacfarlaneWrongful-Convictions.pdf ("Tunnel vision often originates during the investigative
stage. As later processes in the criminal justice system feed off the information generated at this
stage, investigative tunnel vision will often set off a chain reaction that reverberates throughout the
system.").
148. Martin, supra note 145, at 848. The leading legal scholars on the issue of tunnel vision,
Findley and Scott, have correctly urged that more attention be paid to the ways in which tunnel
vision affects criminal cases at all stages, as only then can one evaluate the costs and benefits of
these features and determine appropriate corrective measures. Findley & Scott, supra note 9, at
396-97.
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search warrants. 14 9
1. Components of Tunnel Vision
One key component of tunnel vision is confirmation bias.
"Confirmation bias, as the term is used in psychological literature,
typically connotes the tendency to seek or interpret evidence in ways
that support existing beliefs, expectations, or hypotheses."150
Confirmation bias operates on a subconscious rather than a conscious
level; it involves "unwittingly selecting and interpreting information to
support a previously held belief."i's
Empirical research into
confirmation bias and the criminal justice system has shown that naming
a suspect leads to confirmation bias, both in terms of selecting additional
investigation tactics focused on the suspect and minimizing new
contradictory information; the research showed that people asked to
name a suspect early in a criminal investigation, as compared to those
who did not name a suspect, recommended investigative actions more
focused on the early suspect, even after new information raised
questions about his guilt and potentially implicated others.1 52
Confirmation bias is closely related to another type of bias,
selective information processing. Confirmation bias relates to what type
of information people seek, while selective information processing has
to do with how people interpret the information that they receive. 153
"Selective information processing is the tendency for people to recall
stored information and interpret new information to conform to their preexisting views."' 5 4 Cognitive neuroscience research suggests that this
tendency may stem from the way in which the brain filters and stores
information.'
Because of selective information processing, people
more readily accept information that supports their hypothesis and find
149. See id. at 308-09.
150. Id. at 309.
151. O'Brien, PrimeSuspect, supra note 30, at 316.
152. See id. at 328.
153. See Burke, Neutralizing Cognitive Bias, supra note 8, at 517-518 (discussing how
confirmation bias and selective information processing affect prosecutorial decision-making).
154. Burke, ProsecutorialPassion, supra note 115, at 196 (citing See Charles G. Lord &
Mark R. Lepper, Biased Assimilation and Attitude Polarization: The Effects of Prior Theories on
Subsequently Considered Evidence, 37 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 2098 (1979)).

155. Bandes, supra note 34, at 492 (quoting Jonathan A. Fugelsang & Kevin N. Dunbar, A
Cognitive Neuroscience Frameworkfor UnderstandingCausal Reasoning and the Law, 359 PHIL.
TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SoC'Y LONDON B 1749, 1749-54 (2004) ("Evidence consistent with one's

beliefs is more likely to recruit neural tissue associated with learning and memory, whereas
evidence inconsistent with one's beliefs is more likely to invoke neural tissue associated with error
detection and conflict monitoring.")).
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reasons to discount information that runs counter to that hypothesis.15 6
"[F]or desired conclusions ... it is as if we ask, 'Can I believe this?' but
for unpalatable conclusions we ask, 'Must I believe this?"1 57 This effect
is so strong that even contradictory information can reinforce previous
beliefs. 158
Some authors describe this phenomenon as "belief perseverance,"
i.e., the idea that "[o]nce people form a belief, they may resist changing
it even when compelling evidence contradicts it."' 59 To avoid changing
their beliefs, people sometimes fail to notice or appreciate the
significance of contradictory evidence.1 60 At other times, they can create
and rely on unlikely alternative explanations for the contradictory
evidence. 161
Finally, tunnel vision also includes overconfidence bias, an
extremely well-documented phenomenon.' 62 Overconfidence bias refers
to our tendency to be "unrealistically optimistic about [ourselves] and
[our] talents."16 3
Overconfidence bias may explain why police
sometimes are worse than laypeople at spotting liars, in that
overconfidence bias may minimize police skepticism and prevent them
from taking corrective measures to avoid errors.'6 One author recently
156. Burke, ProsecutorialPassion, supra note 115, at 196.
157. Findley & Scott, supra note 9, at 313-14 (quoting Thomas Gilovich, How WE KNOW
WHAT ISN'T So: THE FALLIBILITY OF HUMAN REASON IN EVERYDAY LIFE 84 (1991)).
158. Burke, ProsecutorialPassion,supra note 115, at 197-98 (describing a study showing that
exposure to two contradictory studies regarding the deterrent effect of the death penalty reinforced
participants preexisting views regarding capital punishment).
159. Barbara O'Brien, A Recipe for Bias: An Empirical Look at the Interplay Between
InstitutionalIncentives and Bounded Rationalityin ProsecutorialDecision Making, 74 Mo. L. REV.
999, 1011-12 (2009) [hereinafter O'Brien, A Recipe for Bias].
160. Id. at 1012.
161. Id. See also Findley & Scott, supra note 9, at 314.
162. J.D. Trout, Paternalism and Cognitive Bias, 24 LAW & PHIL. 393, 400 (2005) ("The
overconfidence bias is one of the most robust findings in contemporary psychology."). See also id.
at 396-408 (providing a good general overview of cognitive biases).
163. Burke, ProsecutorialPassion, supra note 115, at 200. "[Alctors will tend to be less
deterred from the behavior sought to be deterred than they would be in the absence of
[overconfidence] bias; the bias leads them to underestimate in a systematic way the probability that
they will be detected [and punished]." Christine Jolls, On Law Enforcement with Boundedly
RationalActors, in THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF IRRATIONAL BEHAVIOR 274 (Francisco Parisi &

Vernon Smith eds., 2005).
164. See Taslitz, Wrongly Accused Redux, supra note 18, at 1109. Additionally, recent
research demonstrated that judges displayed overconfidence bias regarding their ability to control
their own biases. Rachlinski et al., supra note 127, at 1225-26 ("In recently collected data, we
asked a group of judges attending an educational conference to rate their ability to 'avoid racial
prejudice in decision-making' relative to other judges who were attending the same conference.
Ninety-seven percent (thirty-five out of thirty-six) of the judges placed themselves in the top half
and fifty percent (eighteen out of thirty-six) placed themselves in the top quartile, even though by
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argued that the warrant requirement and the continued viability of the
exclusionary rule are both important safeguards against police
overconfidence about the benefits from illegal searches. 16 5 Overconfidence bias can be accompanied by false consensus bias, which is
the erroneously overconfident belief that everyone else shares one's
views.16 6 False consensus bias could lead officers or judges to assume
that everyone views the evidence in a case the way they do, further
reinforcing tunnel vision and absolving them of perceived responsibility
to investigate other possibilities.
2. Tunnel Vision Likely Affects Police Preparation of Warrant
Applications
Police, like the rest of the population, seem to be affected by tunnel
vision, particularly confirmation bias,167 in ways that could affect the
preparation of search warrant applications. Before exploring the way
that tunnel vision can affect investigations generally and search warrant
applications in particular, however, it is helpful to understand why
officers may be vulnerable to tunnel vision despite their best efforts to
resist it.

Several factors may combine to make police particularly vulnerable
to tunnel vision. For example, "[t]he sheer volume of reported crimes
begging for police investigation" can contribute to tunnel vision, in that
officers "are often under constant pressure to complete their assigned
cases" so they can move on to the next case. 168 Similarly, supervisors
and politicians can be concerned with "clearance rates," i.e., rates of
cases solved, which again can exacerbate investigatory tunnel vision.169
definition, only fifty percent can be above the median, and only twenty-five percent can be in the
top quartile. We worry that this result means that judges are overconfident about their ability to
avoid the influence of race and hence fail to engage in corrective processes on all occasions.").
165. Bryan D. Lammon, Note: The Practical Mandates of the Fourth Amendment: A
Behavioral Argument for the Exclusionary Rule and Warrant Preference, 85 WASH. U. L. REV.
1101, 1128-30 (2007).
166. Jeffrey W. Stempel, In PraiseofProcedurally Centered JudicialDisqualification-and a
Stronger Conception of the Appearance Standard: Better Acknowledging and Adjusting to
Cognitive Bias, Spoliation, and PerceptualRealities, 30 REV. LITIG. 733, 744-45 (2011) (discussing
study showing that readers decided to interpret an ambiguous text and believed that most readers
would agree with their view of the meaning, vastly underreporting the extent of actual disagreement
about the meaning).
167. Karl Ask & Par Anders Granhag, MotivationalSources of Confirmation Bias in Criminal
Investigations: The Need jbr Cognitive Closure, 2 J. INVESTIGATIVE PSYCHOL. & OFFENDER
PROFILING 43, 57 (2005).

168.
169.

Findley & Scott, supra note 9, at 325.
Id. at 324.
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Victims can create another type of pressure, in that police officers may
sometimes be too willing to accept all of a victim's statements, even
when those statements may be distorted by the victim's cognitive
biases.170 Some authors have suggested that the police cultural emphasis
on bringing "truly guilty" people to justice may play a role as well. ' '
Experienced officers may be even more vulnerable to tunnel vision than
less experienced officers may because the former may rely more heavily
on their prior experiences, which could lead them astray.17 2 Obviously,
these pressures are not always present, and officers may work hard to
avoid being affected by them; nonetheless, in the aggregate, these factors
can contribute to tunnel vision.
In particular, these pressures can make it easy to focus on an initial
suspect or theory, and confirmation bias and selective information
processing can then make it harder for investigators to identify
alternative theories or appropriately evaluate the weight of potentially
contradictory evidence. 173 That in turn may affect the quality of the
evidence gathered.174 A 2005 study specifically explored the effect that
tunnel vision can have on police investigative decisions. 7 5 In particular,
the officers in the study showed bias in terms of how they interpreted
new information during an investigation7 . and insensitivity to
later in the
potentially exonerating information presented
investigation.177
As applied to the search warrant context, tunnel vision can affect
police actions in a number of ways. Once an officer forms a theory that
a particular individual has likely committed a crime, that theory can
shape what evidence the officer seeks to develop.' 78 An officer's theory
170. Id. Findley and Scott also note the potential effects on police officers of public pressure
in high-profile cases and of being exposed to crime scenes and other disturbing facets of cases more
generally. Id. at 323-24.
171. MACFARLANE, supra note 147, at 25-26. See also Taslitz, Wrongly Accused Redux,
supra note 18, at 1110 (noting how police culture can reinforce what he calls the "blinders effect,"
which is consistent with the description of tunnel vision above).
172. See Everett Doolittle, Perspective: The Disease of Certainty, FBI LAW ENFORCEMENT
BULLETIN (March 2012), available at http://www.fbi.gov/stats-services/publications/lawenforcement-bulletin/march-2012/perspective.
173. See Findley & Scott, supra note 9, at 326.
174. See Martin, supra note 145, at 849-50.
175. Ask & Granhag, supra note 167, at 57.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 58.
178. See O'Brien, Prime Suspect, supra note 30, at 328. See also O'Brien, A Recipe for Bias,
supra note 159, at 1012 ("Once a hypothesis is formed, people search for information that supports
that hypothesis rather than an alternative. That is, they unconsciously assume that the hypothesis in
question is true and search for evidence accordingly. They are not completely indifferent to
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of the case can affect his decisions about what type of evidence to look
for and where to look for it; "[i]mportant physical evidence, either
confirmatory or exculpatory, might also be overlooked if the theory of
the case prevailing at the time of evidence collection later proves
wrong." 7 9 These factors could influence when officers seek search
warrants and who should be targeted for searches.
In some circumstances, an investigator's belief that he or she has
correctly focused on a suspect can lead that officer to use improper
means to build the case against that suspect; that behavior can be
rationalized as "helping the truth along."' 80 This phenomena, sometimes
referred to as "noble cause corruption," involves an extreme focus on the
"ends" of achieving justice at the expense of the means sought to obtain
those ends, creating an "ends-based investigative culture that prompts
investigators to blind themselves to their own inappropriate conduct, and
to perceive that conduct as legitimate in the belief that they are pursuing
Tunnel vision and noble cause
an important public interest."s'8
corruption together distort an investigation; once an investigator
becomes convinced that a suspect is guilty, he or she may use improper
methods to try to prove the suspect's guilt, "rationalizing these steps on
82
the basis that they are 'merely helping the truth along."'
One way that investigators might "help the truth along" can involve
developing informants. Officers may have hypotheses about how a
crime occurred and who did it, and they may have personal contacts with
individuals whom think they could provide useful information.' In that
circumstance, the officer will "typically have both the ability and some
inclination to help the informant shape the story line in a particular
direction." 84 Officers may do so innocently by supplying information
contrary information, but assuming the truth of the hypothesis causes them to undervalue that
evidence or not to notice it in the first place.").
179. Findley & Scott, supra note 9, at 327. See also O'Brien, A Recipe for Bias, supra note
159, at 1012 (also discussing contradictory evidence being overlooked).
180. Findley & Scott, supra note 9, at 326-27.
181. MACFARLANE, supra note 147, at 20. Noble cause corruption can be viewed as a form of
intentional wrongdoing, as individuals are willing to lie to achieve their ends, but it arguably falls
within the general category of cognitive bias, in that such individuals seem to genuinely believe that
their conduct is justified in pursuit of a greater good. Again, the line between cognitive bias and
intentional wrongdoing is sometimes a fine one, and it is less important to draw that line clearly as it
is to explore the motivations behind behavior to help identify the incentives that can lead to
adjustments in that behavior.
182. Id. at 24.
183. Mosteller, supra note 28, at 556-57.
184. Id. at 557. See also Martin, supra note 145, at 861 (describing several cases in which
police leapt to conclusions about what happened, then pressured individuals to explain what
happened consistent with that view).
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inadvertently and by engaging in selective information processing in
response to the informant's story, or they may deliberately push the
informant for a certain version of events. 85
In those circumstances, informants have strong incentives to
provide the officer's preferred versions of events, whether or not that is
the truth:
Informants have a clear interest in pleasing those who control their
freedom, and if they can discern the expectations and needs of the authorities, their self-interest mandates that they tailor their stories along
the anticipated and desired lines. Strong incentives lead to risks of distorted information and false testimony. In particular, there is clear potential for these incentives to produce false evidence implicating those
"believed" to be guilty of the crimes and for informants to embellish
the responsibility of those they implicate. 86
Thus, a potential informant may begin by denying all knowledge or
participation but may eventually confirm the investigator's beliefs.187
And while informants have incentives to provide distorted information,
officers are unlikely to be adequately skeptical of that information.'88
Cognitive biases such as selective information processing and belief
perseverance may make it hard for them to recognize when informants
shade their stories to match officer expectations.189
Prosecutors are not likely to be of much help in overcoming these
tunnel vision problems. Prosecutors typically have limited involvement
in handling inform9antsi0 or in search warrant applications. t 9 ' When
185. Mosteller, supra note 28, at 557.
186. Id. at 552. See also id. at 548-49 (noting that typical deals between informants and law
enforcement strongly resemble conduct punishable as bribery in any other circumstances); Martin,
supranote 145, at 861 ("These are common situations for the generation of informer evidence. That
is, vulnerable individuals, faced with the threat that they will themselves be charged and
imprisoned, offer testimony against someone else.").
187. Mosteller, supra note 28, at 557.
188. See Taslitz, Wrongly Accused Redux, supra note 18, at 1095-96.
189. Compare the discussion of noble cause corruption in MACFARLANE, supra note 147, at
39 with the discussion in O'Brien, A Recipe for Bias, supra note 159, at 1012 and Martin, supra
note 145, at 859-60.
190. Natapoff, Snitching, supra note 15, at 652-53, 675.
191. See VAN DUIZEND ET AL., supra note 57, at 19-21; Uchida & Bynum, supra note 15, at
1056 (noting that two of seven jurisdictions studied routinely had prosecutors review and approve
search warrant applications prior to submission to a magistrate). See also Natapoff, Snitching,
supra note 15, at 675 (noting that the investigation decisions are legally considered to be police
work and that prosecutorial absolute immunity does not apply when prosecutors participate in
investigations). But see Benner and Samarkos, supra note I1, at 225 (noting that 98.4% of the
search warrants included in their study were reviewed by a prosecutor for legal sufficiency). The
practice seems to vary significantly by jurisdiction.
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they are involved, they may not be able to recognize the inherent
problems in this information as the case proceeds. 1 9 2
Instead,
prosecutors are subject to many of the same pressures described above
regarding police,' 9 3 and their role within the adversary system reinforces
tunnel vision.194 "The adversary system encourages lawyers to seek out
information that is helpful to their position, to interpret it in a way that
helps their position, and to present it, within ethical bounds, in the best
possible light."' 95 Thus, police and prosecutors are often dependent on
informant tips and fail to look skeptically at those tips.196 Given these
forces, magistrate review can play a significant role in combatting tunnel
vision, but only when magistrates are given full disclosure and when
they appreciate the importance of their role in the process.
C. MagistrateReview of WarrantApplications May Be Affected by
Framing,Priming,and ImplicitBiases
Magistrates are less likely than police officers to be subject to
tunnel vision, given the different roles that magistrates, police, and
prosecutors play in the system. Magistrates are not responsible for the
investigation or subject to the same kinds of pressures that lead to tunnel
vision in police and prosecutors.' 97 Similarly, magistrates are less likely
to be affected by pre-existing beliefs in ways that would lead to selective
information processing, so they should be more able to make objective
and accurate assessments of the evidence.' 9 8 For example, magistrates
192. See Findley & Scott, supra note 9, at 329 (discussing the particular cognitive challenges
for prosecutors because of missing information or a lack of the full context of the information they
receive from police).
193. Natapoff, Snitching,supra note 15, at 676.
194. Findley & Scott, supra note 9, at 331. See also Id. ("The process of being a prosecutor,
even an ethical prosecutor, thus exacerbates general cognitive biases and contributes to tunnel
vision.").
195. Bandes, supra note 33, at 490.
196. Alexandra Natapoff, Beyond Unreliable: How Snitches Contribute to Wrongful
Convictions, 37 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 107, 108 (2006) [hereinafter Natapoff, Beyond
Unreliable] ("Informants lie primarily in exchange for lenience for their own crimes, although
sometimes they lie for money. In order to obtain the benefit of these lies, informants must persuade
the government that their lies are true. Police and prosecutors, in turn, often do not and cannot
check these lies because the snitch's information may be all the government has. Additionally,
police and prosecutors are heavily invested in using informants to conduct investigations and to
make their cases. As a result, they often lack the objectivity and the information that would permit
them to discern when informants are lying. This gives rise to a disturbing marriage of convenience:
both snitches and the government benefit from inculpatory information while neither has a strong
incentive to challenge it.").
197. See supraPart llI.B.2.
198. See Burke, Prosecutorial Passion, supra note 115, at 208 (discussing judges, but the
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should be less inclined to overestimate the reliability of informants than
either police officers or prosecutors who have extensive contact with the
informants.' 99 Magistrates may also be better able to assess the true
significance of information that undercuts the informant's credibility.2 00
Of course, magistrates (and later reviewing judges) do not always seem
willing to scrutinize the informants' credibility, 20' but their position
within the structure of the system makes them more able to do so. 202
However, magistrates may be affected to some extent by both
framing and priming biases. Framing and priming are closely related
concepts involving the "big cognitive difference" that first impressions
make.203 More specifically, the term "framing bias" refers to the fact
that people tend to view a problem differently depending on the
perspective from which it is examined.204 Priming can be seen as the
action of framing to lead to a particular result: "Quite simply, priming
refers to the use of a stimulus, or prime, to alter [people's] perceptions of
subsequent information." 20 5
The way officers draft search warrants may implicate these
concepts. As the officer presents the information to the magistrate in
support of a search warrant application, the officer is unlikely to give the
magistrate a full picture of the situation by bringing in details that would
undermine the officer's theory. Instead, the officer drafting the search
warrant will typically articulate the facts in ways that are shaped both by
the officer's theory and with the officer's understanding of the governing
law, which can hinder the magistrate's ability to provide meaningful

same reasoning applies to magistrates as well).
199. See, e.g., Yaroshefsky, supra note 40, at 944-45 (discussing the difficulties of police and
prosecutors maintaining objectivity about informants when they develop relationships with them).
200. See id. at 932-33 (discussing reasons that prosecutors overestimate the truthfulness of
informants); Mosteller, supra note 28, at 556 ("[b]ecause investigators rather than prosecutors
generally have the initial contact with the individuals who become informants, critical alterations in
the informants' stories may occur without the prosecutor's knowledge, which effectively hides from
the prosecutor's scrutiny key data for evaluating informants' veracity.").
201. See supra Part II.D.2 and Bowman, supra note 20.
202. See infra Part IV.A.2 about the importance of educating all involved in the search warrant
process about the value of magistrates providing meaningful review.
203. lan Weinstein, Don't Believe Everything You Think: Cognitive Bias in Legal Decision
Making, 9 CLINICAL L. REV. 783, 796 (2003).
204. Id. at 797.
205. Michael J. Higdon, Something Judicious This Way Comes ... The Use ofForeshadowing
as a Persuasive Devise in Judicial Narrative, 44 U. RICH. L. REV. 1213, 1228 (2010). See also
Kathryn M. Stanchi, The Power of Priming in Legal Advocacy: Using the Science of First
Impressions to Persuade the Reader, 89 OR. L. REV. 305, 321, 348 (2010) (discussing the ways in
which priming can affect decision-making while operating at an unconscious level).
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review. 2 06 Some research suggests that exposure to an officer's theory
of the case can frame the review of the evidence.2 07 The checklist
proposed in Part IV might help minimize that potential effect by
requiring the officer to use a standardized format to present the
information, rather than framing it in terms of the officer's theory. The
checklist may also help ensure that additional details are provided, not
just those that support the officer's theory.
Priming, however, may be more serious when connected to implicit
bias. Numerous studies show that racial and ethnical stereotypes can be
easily primed. 2 08 For example, one mock jury study showed that seeing
a photograph of black skin for a few seconds rather than a photograph of
white skin for the same period led to increased conviction rates. 209 Even
without explicit references to race, racial stereotypes can be activated
based on seeing someone's name or photograph. 21 0 Thus, "even though
many decisions are made on papers only, judges might unwittingly react
to names or neighborhoods that are associated with certain races." 2 11
These minimal references to race may unconsciously affect judges'
analysis of the totality of the circumstances regarding search warrant
applications "and make probable cause appear more readily when the
suspect is Hispanic or Black and lives in a 'high crime' area[.]" 2 12
Similarly, Professor Taslitz argues that judges may unconsciously be
more accepting of informants' tips implicating racial minorities because
they play into racial stereotypes.2 13 In support, he relies in part on social
psychology research into rumors, which shows that "[r]umors that are
consistent with pre-existing attitudes, including toward racial group

206. See Martin, supranote 145, at 852.
207. See O'Brien, Recipe for Bias, supra note 159, at 1045-46 (discussing "groupthink" and
studies of Dutch independent crime analysts who showed more true independence when they were
shielded from primary investigator's theory of the case than when they could tell the investigator's
theory).
208. Smith & Levinson, supra note 123, at 799-801 (describing several studies that showed
both activation of stereotypes and effects on decision-making).
209. Id. at 800-01.
210. Id. at 798.
211. Rachlinski, supra note 127, at 1225. That conclusion is also supported by empirical
research showing that judicial decisions in other contexts are likely affected by priming and implicit
bias. Id. at 1223 (when judges with strong white preferences on the IAT were exposed to a "black
subliminal prime," those judges "made somewhat harsher judgments of the juvenile defendants,"
while judges with strong black preferences on the IAT made somewhat more lenient decisions after
exposure to the same prime). See also id. ("In effect, the subliminal processes triggered
unconscious bias, and in just the way that might be expected.").
212. Benner, supra note 129, at 223.
213. Taslitz, Wrongly Accused Redux, supra note 18, at 1129.
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members, are more likely to be believed." 2 14 Thus, informant tips may
trigger common unconscious associations between African-Americans,
guilt, and dangerousness.215 Thus, even minimal references to race, such
as names, heavily minority locations, or photographs could trigger
implicit associations with dangerousness or guilt, even in the minds of
well-meaning magistrates who are not consciously racially biased.
Interestingly, an empirical study showed that when race was more
explicit, rather than triggered by subliminal primes, judges more
successfully controlled for bias.2 16 That study concluded that judges
were in fact able to compensate for bias when they were both motivated
to avoid seeming biased and faced clear cues regarding the potential for
217
bias in a particular case.217 The study's author questioned, however,
whether those conditions would be present when judges were deciding
cases in their courtrooms, rather than just in a study done at a
conference.218 And as noted above, race is more likely to be implicit
-219
rather than explicit in the search warrant
process.
D. Post-SearchJudicialReview of WarrantApplications Likely to Be
Affected by Biases
Cognitive biases also likely affect post-search judicial review. As
explained in Part II.D above, once a search warrant is issued and
executed, charges may be filed against defendants, and then defense
counsel may bring suppression motions to challenge the validity of the
admission of the evidence. In doing so, they can either accept the
214. Id. at 1136.
215. Smith & Levinson, supra note 123, at 801-02 (discussing associations between Black and
aggressive); id. at 804-05 (discussing a study demonstrating an association between Black and
guilty). Taslitz suggests that the problem of implicit bias may be exacerbated by both the increased
role for judicial discretion under Gates and by officers' use of boilerplate language in search
warrants. Taslitz, Wrongly Accused Redux, supra note 18, at 1129, n.279, 1130.
216. Rachlinski, supra note 127, at 1223.
217. Id. at 1225 (noting the time pressures and other distractions that might make it more
difficult for judges to successfully compensate for bias in the courtroom than in study conditions).
218. Id.
219. Even if I am right about the way that implicit bias can affect search warrant analysis, it is
almost certain that these effects will not be remediable through individual litigation challenges. See,
e.g., Andrew Taslitz, The Death of Probable Cause: Forward, 73 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. i, vi
(2010) (noting that the Supreme Court has made clear that subjective racial bias is irrelevant under
the Fourth Amendment and has suggested that disparate racial impact would similarly be irrelevant
to Fourth Amendment analysis). My point in discussing implicit racial bias here is not to challenge
that precedent, although I do find it problematic. Instead, my point is to focus those involved in the
search warrant process on how their decisions can be impacted by implicit racial bias, despite their
best intentions to the contrary. My hope is that increased awareness will in part help lead to better
decision-making. See infra Part IV.A, regarding the value of education about cognitive biases.
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information in the search warrant as true and challenge whether it
established probable cause, or they can contest the accuracy or
completeness of the information supporting the search warrant by
bringing a Franks challenge. Trial courts hearing these motions, and
appellate courts reviewing their decisions, may be vulnerable to the
same cognitive biases discussed above, and they may also be particularly
vulnerable to an additional type of bias, hindsight bias, as explained
below.
1. Effects of Implicit, Framing, and Confirmation Biases on
Judicial Review
The analysis above about implicit bias and priming seems likely to
apply to reviewing judges in the same ways. Additionally, reviewing
judges may be particularly affected by framing bias. Framing bias means
that people typically tend to look more favorably on the same outcome
when it is framed as a gain rather than as a loss. 22 0 Framing can affect
decisions about, for example, whether to accept a settlement of a tort
case, whether to sell stock, and whether to accept a plea bargain; these
choices all look different depending on whether they seem to be gains or
losses as compared to the decision-maker's perceived baseline. 22 1 The
accuracy of the perceived baseline can therefore have huge impacts on
later decision-making.222 The baseline in Franks cases is that the
magistrate found probable cause to issue the search warrant and then
evidence was found, so reviewing judges are likely to see exclusion of
the evidence as a loss to be avoided. The structure of the Franks test
may enhance framing bias, in that the cases often stress the heavy
burden borne by the defendant at each stage of the analysis, as discussed
above; that structure primes courts to view admission of the evidence as
a gain and the exclusion of evidence as a loss.
Furthermore, framing bias may compound the effects of
confirmation bias of reviewing judges, particularly when judges evaluate
evidence that seems to corroborate informants' tips. 2 23 Because
220. That research often deals with risk and money evaluations (e.g. retaining money versus
money lost). Burke, Prosecutorial Passion, supra note 115, at 198 (citing Daniel Kahneman &
Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263
(1979); and Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of
Choice, 211 SCIENCE 453, 453 (1981)).
221. Weinstein, supra note 203, at 797-99.
222. See id. at 799-800 (discussing the ways in which comments made during rapport-building
with clients can therefore effect the client's later valuation of a potential plea deal).
223. See, e.g., MACFARLANE, supra note 147, at 39 (discussing how that played out in a
particular case); Lammon, supra note 165, at 1141.
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reviewing courts know that evidence was found, they may begin with the
hypothesis that the search warrant that led to the evidence being found
was validly issued. That belief may lead them to overvalue evidence
that seems to corroborate the hypothesis and undervalue evidence that
would contradict it.22 4 For example, confirmation bias may lead
reviewing courts to overvalue evidence gathered by police that is
consistent with the informant's tips, even when that information does not
logically suggest the informant is right about the suspect's criminal
activity.225 In one representative case, the Sixth Circuit excused an
affiant's failure to describe the informants' prior inconsistent
descriptions of who was involved in the conspiracy under investigation;
the court relied on corroboration but failed to appreciate that the
corroborated information only showed that the informant was familiar
with the defendant generally but not that the defendant was involved in

criminal activity. 2 2 6
Additionally, confirmation bias may minimize magistrates'
skepticism about the accuracy of corroborative information presented.
For example, one study of search warrants cited positively the idea that
police routinely corroborated informants' tips by using "controlled buys"
(i.e., purchasing narcotics from the location that will be the target of the
search, under police surveillance).227 However, faked controlled buys
have been found to have contributed to multiple wrongful convictions of
those targeted by informants.228 Yet courts do not seem to look
skeptically at evidence regarding controlled buys. 2 2 9 Confirmation bias
may contribute to courts' failures to recognize the possibility of these
fabrications.
224. See Findley & Scott, supra note 9, at 312-13 (quoting Raymond S. Nickerson,
Confirmation Bias: A Ubiquitous Phenomenon in Many Guises, 2 REv. GEN. PSYCHOL. 175, 180
(1998)).
225. See generally Erlinder, supra note 44 (describing the evolution of the Supreme Court
cases on how corroboration affects probable cause analysis, most of which gave too much weight to
confirmation of information about legal activity and incorrectly used that information to corroborate
tips about illegal activity). See also infra Part IV.C.3 (discussing the need for courts to treat
seemingly corroboratory evidence more skeptically).
226. United States v. Trujillo, 376 F.3d 593, 603 (6th Cir. 2004) (noting that the officers
verified the defendants' address as given to them by the informants and the fact that one defendant
had previously served a prison sentence for drug crimes).
227. Benner & Samarkos, supra note 11, at 243-44.
228. See, e.g., Trott, supra note 18, at 1384.
229. See, e.g., United States v. Harrison, 400 F. Supp. 2d 780, 783-84, 786, 787 (E.D. Pa.
2005) (defendant showed that the warrant contained significant inaccurate information about the
first controlled buy and arguably established that it had not occurred at all, yet the court relied on
other similar evidence in upholding the warrant without adequately analyzing whether the
defendant's showing undercut the reliability of the remaining evidence as well).
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Additionally, confirmation bias may play a role in courts' deference
to officers' versions of events and their failure to take a hard look at the
plausibility of the officers' accounts. For example, courts in several
cases reject without any real factual scrutiny the defendants' allegations
that the confidential informant could not possibly have seen what they
said they did, so either the officer fabricated the informant entirely or the
officer was reckless in relying on the informant's statements without
230
doing more investigation.20 Similarly, these courts reject claims that the
prosecution should have to disclose the identity of the informant in order
to allow the defendant the opportunity to make the necessary preliminary
showing.2 3 1 Instead, the courts tend to defer to the officer, even when
the facts suggest grounds for skepticism.232
Confirmation bias may also play a role in the Franks omissions
cases in which the courts seem to discount the value of the omitted
information.23 3 If courts assume that the warrant was validly issued,
then they would be skeptical of evidence that would undercut that
conclusion and looking for ways to confirm the conclusion.2 34 In fact,
courts routinely reject as insufficient defendants' claims that the
affidavit should have included information about the informant's bias or
motive to lie,235 information that is relevant to assessing the informant's
veracity and therefore the role his or her statements should play in the
probable cause determination.23 6 For example, the court in one case
concluded that there was no reason to suppose a judge would want to
know about informant bias or desire to gain publicity for providing
information, wrongly asserting that those motives would not lead an
230. See, e.g., United States v. Rodriguez-Suazo, 346 F.3d 637, 645 (6th Cir. 2003).
231. See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 3 F.3d 673, 679-80 (3d Cir. 1993) (disclosure of
informant's identity under Franks only required after defendant makes substantial preliminary
showing).
232. See, e.g., id. at 676-78 (defendant's Franksmotion factual showing significantly undercut
the informant's story, and the officer's writing of the affidavit contained other inaccuracies, which
should undercut the deference shown to the officer, but the court affirmed the trial court's refusal to
grant a Franks hearing). Even when courts do grant a hearing in these circumstances, they still tend
to defer to the officer's statements even when the facts suggest reasonable grounds for skepticism.
See, e.g., State v. Klar, 400 So. 2d 610 (La. 1981) (court accepted testimony of affiant rather than
defendant, informant, and other witnesses).
233. See supra Part 1l.D.2 regarding Franks omissions cases.
234. See supra Part Ill.B.1 regarding confirmation bias.
235. See, e.g., United States v. Croto, 570 F.3d 11, 15 (1st Cir. 2009) (defendant claimed
informants were biased against him because they were tired of him selling marijuana); State v.
Lease, 472 S.E.2d 59, 61-62 (La. 1996) (omission of fact that informant was extremely agitated
because of her desire to remove her child from the home of the defendant, the child's father, was not
fatal to validity of the warrant).
236. See generally Bowman, supra note 20.
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informant to provide false information rather than true incriminating
information.2 37 Similarly, another case concluded that there was no error
in failing to include information that the defendant's granddaughter was
going to be a witness against the informant in cases involving the
* -238
informant's own criminal activity.
However, the informant's motivation should be part of the probable
cause analysis. 2 39 The informant's reliability is an important component
of how courts should determine probable cause, even under the Gates
totality of the circumstances test. 24 0 And the informants' motives can
directly undercut that reliability determination, in that their motives may
lead them to provide rumors, guesses, or deliberately false information if
they believe that such information will not be held against them if it
proves to be incorrect. 2 4 1 If that information is consistent with what
police wanted to hear, investigative tunnel vision makes it very likely
that the officer will not question that information.242 Courts occasionally
recognize the significance of information undercutting the informant's
reliability when analyzing Franks omissions challenges, 243 but these
cases are far rarer than ones that simply conclude that the omitted
information regarding informant credibility does not matter.
Similarly, the courts should more carefully scrutinize claims that
the affidavit should have included more information about the
informant's deal with police, to provide information in exchange for
some benefit, like leniency244 or payment.245 For example, a court
237. United States v. Harding, 273 F. Supp. 2d 411, 426,427 (S.D. N.Y. 2003).
238. United States v. Bell, 692 F. Supp. 2d 606, 610 (W.D. Va. 2010).
239. See Bowman, supra note 20, at Part Ill.C.4, regarding how courts should analyze
informants' motivations when assessing the informants' reliability.
240. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230, 233, 239 n.l 1 (1983).
241. See Bowman, supra note 20, at Part Ill.C.4 (noting that courts often look at this issue the
wrong way, asking whether the informants have an incentive to provide accurate information rather
than asking whether informants have a disincentive to provide information that they are unsure of its
accuracy).
242. See supra Part Ill.B.2.
243. See, e.g., United States v. Vigeant, 176 F.3d 565 (1st Cir. 1999) (omission of information
regarding informant's unreliability, combined with information of other important information that
cast doubt on the defendant's guilt, was sufficient to allow court to infer that information was
recklessly omitted); State v. Utterback, 485 N.W.2d 760 (1992) (omission of fact that informant was
admitted liar and had confessed to forgery was designed to create the false impression that
informant was a reliable citizen informant).
244. See, e.g., United States v. Allen, 297 F.3d 790 (8th Cir. 2002) ("search warrant affidavits
need not provide judicial officers with all the details of bargaining between police and arrested
persons from whom they are seeking to get information"); United States v. Legualt, 323 F. Supp. 2d
217, 226 (D. Mass 2004) (defendant argued affidavit should have included information re. favorable
bail conditions informant received in exchange for information; court found that would have
"enhanced her credibility rather than weakened it because it provides an incentive to give accurate
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concluded that there was no error in failing to include in an affidavit that
the informant was currently facing twenty felony charges and was
providing information in the hope of receiving leniency.2 46 That
information does not necessarily mean that the informant should not be
found reliable, but it does suggest that the informant may be influenced
by powerful incentives to tell the police what they want to hear, and the
cognitive bias research suggests that the police may not be able to
recognize informant falsehoods in these circumstances. Another Franks
case suggests that possibility more directly: the defendant's affidavit
stated that the affiant officer had previously approached another
individual and offered him "immediate release from detainment with no
further actions" if he would say that he purchased marijuana from the
defendant.2 47 The Sixth Circuit found it "unremarkable" that the officer
asked the individual to incriminate the defendant,2 48 even though the
officer's direct request for the informant to incriminate the defendant for
a particular crime could be an example of investigative tunnel vision that
can lead directly to false informant testimony, as discussed above.
Reviewing courts should not treat such a statement as unremarkable, but
should instead provide a more robust review of the case, including more
carefully scrutinizing the circumstances surrounding the informant's
incentives to provide untruthful information.2 49
Equally troubling is the courts' failure to take seriously claims.
about informants providing inconsistent stories, given the dynamics
discussed above regarding informants having incentives to tailor their
stories to what the police want to hear. For example, in United States v.
Trujillo, the defendant argued unsuccessfully that she should be entitled
to a Franks hearing because the affidavit failed to include the fact that
the informants had given numerous inconsistent explanations of the facts
regarding their being caught transporting marijuana before settling on a
version that incriminated the defendant as the intended recipient of the

information); State v. Grimshaw, 515 A.2d 1201, 1203-04 (N.H. 1986) (omission of fact that
charges against informant were dropped in exchange for information did not matter because the
magistrate was informed that the informant had been arrested).
245. United States v. Muldoon, 931 F.2d 282, 286 (4th Cir. 1991) (while evidence that
informant and his wife were paid had "some bearing on [the informant's] credibility," omitting that
information from the affidavit was not fatal to probable cause because of the other evidence against
the defendant); State v. Garberding, 801 P.2d 583 (Mont. 1990) (omission of fact that informant was
paid for information was not material because it did not cast doubt on the informant's reliability).
246. United States v. Bell, 692 F. Supp. 2d 606, 610 (W.D. Va. 2010).
247. United States v. Stuart, 507 F.3d 391, 394 (6th Cir. 2007).
248. See id. at 397-98.
249. See generally Bowman, supra note 20, at Part 11l.C.
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shipment.250 The court concluded, however, that the inconsistent
statements would not have negated the existence of probable cause.251
In so concluding, the court did not point to the strength of other evidence
supporting probable cause,25 2 and the informants' statements were
crucial to demonstrating the defendant's involvement, as the police were
unable to arrange for controlled delivery or other unambiguous activity
by the defendant.253 Therefore, the prior inconsistent statements were
arguably quite significant, and the court dismissed their omission too
easily, perhaps because of the cognitive biases discussed above.
2. Hindsight Bias
Confirmation bias may be compounded by hindsight bias.
Hindsight bias is the tendency to view an event, after it has occurred, as
having been more likely to occur than it really was. 25 4 Our mind
automatically makes inferences or connections based on knowledge of
what happened, such that things that were likely to lead to the actual
outcome seem more important than things that were likely to lead to
different outcomes.2 55 As a result, people believe that the actual
outcome was more likely or predictable, or even inevitable, than it
actually was.256 As a result of hindsight bias, it is very difficult to ignore
the outcome, even when asked to do so, while evaluating what preceded
it.

257

Hindsight bias is generally not a significant issue for police officers
seeking search warrants, as they have not yet performed the search to see
if their investigative hypothesis is correct.258 Nor is it a significant issue
for magistrates deciding whether to issue a search warrant. In fact,
preventing hindsight bias is a major argument in favor of requiring
search warrants rather than reviewing warrantless searches through
250. United States v. Trujillo, 376 F.3d 593, 602 (6th Cir. 2004). The defendant argued that
these inconsistent stories should have entitled her to a Franks hearing at which she could crossexamine the investigating agent to show that the agent acted with reckless disregard for the truth.
Id.
251. Id. at 604.
252. See id.
253. See id. at 600.
254. Burke, ProsecutorialPassion,supra note 115, at 200.
255. Wistrich et al., supra note 117, at 1269.
256. Findley & Scott, supra note 9, at 317.
257. Wistrich et al., supra note 17, at 1269.
258. Findley and Scott argue that hindsight bias can compound tunnel vision during an
investigation. See Findley & Scott, supra note 9, at 318. Their arguments, however, seem to relate
more to selective information processing and confirmation bias, rather than true hindsight bias, as
they do not focus on effects from a particular outcome having occurred.
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suppression hearings.259 The Supreme Court sometimes makes this
point in noting the importance of warrants.2 60
But hindsight bias is at least theoretically a significant issue for
judges who review the magistrate's decision after the search has
occurred and charges have been filed against a defendant.26' Judges are
likely to be affected by hindsight bias because their job often requires
them to evaluate events after they have occurred.262 That fact arguably
calls into question the ability of judges to perform effective ex post
review.263 Findley and Scott argue that hindsight bias is particularly
serious in cases where the courts require defendants to meet a burden of
persuasion or show that a trial court error prejudiced them in significant
ways.264 Whether hindsight bias regarding searches is actually a serious
problem is the subject of some debate.
Some scholars argue that hindsight bias significantly affects judicial
decisions on searches. For example, Professor Taslitz has argued that
case law demonstrates that hindsight bias sometimes affects probable
cause determinations, for example, when courts combine knowledge of
several officers to find probable cause even when the officers did not
share information, or when the courts rely heavily on guilt by
association. 26 5 Similarly, Professor Uphoff argues that in his experience,
judges deciding suppression motions have difficulty avoiding being
"affected by the fact that the police, acting pursuant to that warrant,
found the drugs right where the anonymous tipster claimed they would
259. See, e.g., Lammon, supra note 165, at 1130-31 (discussing the risk of hindsight bias in ex
post "reasonableness" determinations and advocating for a return to stronger "warrant preference").
See also id. at 1140 ("A simple yet effective way to eliminate outcome information would be to
move the determination of reasonableness to before any outcome information exists, i.e., before the
search. A stricter warrant preference, with its necessary ex ante determinations of reasonableness,
would accomplish just that.").
260. See, e.g., United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 565 (1976) (noting that one
purpose of the warrant preference "is to prevent hindsight from coloring the evaluation of the
reasonableness of a search or seizure"). See also Florida v. White, 526 U.S. 559, 570 (1999)
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting the "inherent risks of hindsight at post-seizure hearings").
261. In this part, I use the general term "judges" to refer to both trial judges hearing
suppression motions of Franks challenges and appellate judges reviewing the trial court judges'
decisions. When material is more likely to apply to trial or appellate judges differently, I use the
more specific terms.
262. Chris Guthrie et al., Blinking on the Bench: How Judges Decide Cases, 93 CORNELL L.
REV. 1, 24 (2007) [hereinafter Guthrie et al., Blinking].
263. See, e.g., Chris Guthrie et al., Inside the JudicialMind, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 777, 804-05
(2001) [hereinafter Guthrie et al., JudicialMind].
264. Findley & Scott, supra note 9, at 322 (discussing burden of persuasion) and 320-21
(discussing harmless error, the prejudice prong of ineffective assistance of counsel claims, and the
materiality prong of the Brady doctrine).
265. Taslitz, What Is Probable Cause, supra note 24, at 153.
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be." 266
Those arguments are consistent with the empirical research
showing that judges are affected by hindsight bias in a variety of
contexts. For example, a 2001 article shows that judges were affected
by hindsight bias in that being informed of the outcome of an issue on
appeal seemed to affect their determination of the likelihood of that
outcome.2 67 More importantly, a study dealing with illegal police
searches suggested that knowledge of the outcome of a search affected
juror decisions about whether to award damages and how to interpret the
facts about the search.26 8
But a more recent study by Wistrich et al. suggested that judges
were able to resist hindsight bias in making probable cause
determinations.26 9 In that study, judges were divided into two groups,
one asked to review a search ex ante by asking them whether they would
grant a search warrant, while the other group reviewed the search ex post
by reviewing a suppression motion assuming that no warrant had been
sought.270 Both groups were given the identical factual scenario, other
than differences in terms of the timing of review. 2 7 1 The ex post group
was then told that the search revealed approximately ten pounds of
narcotics and a gun that may have been the weapon used in a recent
murder.272 Much to the surprise of the study's authors, this study failed
to show any appreciable evidence of hindsight bias.273 The judges in the
ex post group ignored the significant evidence produced by the search
and made almost identical decisions to the ex ante group that did not

266. Rodney J. Uphoff, On Misjudging and Its Implications for Criminal Defendants, Their
Lawyers, and the Criminal Justice System, 7 NEV. L.J. 521, 528-29 (2007).
267. Guthrie et al., Judicial Mind, supra note 263, at 801-03. Other research suggested that
judges' determinations of negligence were influenced by hindsight bias. See Wistrich et al., supra
note 117, at 1314 (citing e.g. John C. Anderson, D. Jordan Lowe & Philip M.J. Reckers, Evaluation
ofAuditor Decisions: Hindsight Bias Effects and the Expectation Gap, 14 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 711,
732 (1993)).
268. See Jonathan D. Casper et al., Cognitions, Attitudes, and Decision-Making in Search and
Seizure Cases, 18 JOURNAL OF APPLIED SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 93, 110 (1988).
269.

Wistrich et al., supra note 117, at 1317-18.

270. Id. at 1314-15.
271. See id. at 1315. The ex ante group was told that the officer who had observed various
suspicious but ambiguous facts was seeking a telephonic warrant to search an automobile, while the
ex post group was told that the officer had relied on the same facts to search the automobile without
the warrant. Id. Either officer decision would be plausible under existing case law regarding
automobile searches. Id. at 1316.
272. Id. at 1315.
273. Id. at 1317. Instead, for both groups, approximately twenty-five percent of the judges
found probable cause justified the search, while the remaining seventy-five percent did not. Id. at

1316.
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know about the evidence produced.274
That study did not involve probable cause determinations based on
informant tips,275 and none of the authors' suggested explanations for
these results seem likely to prevent hindsight bias in search warrant
cases based on informant tips. For example, the study's authors suggest
that searching appellate review helps prevent hindsight bias.276 The
authors posit that the suppression decision, as well as the decision in
another scenario that showed surprisingly little hindsight bias, were
likely to be appealed and subject to reversal, without a deferential
standard of review on appeal, which may have made the trial judges
more cautious in their decision-making.277 However, magistrates'
decisions to approve search warrants are given great deference by
reviewing courts. 2 7 8 And the relevant case law suggests that courts fail
to provide meaningful searching review of magistrate decisions.27 9
The study authors' other explanations are similarly unlikely to
prevent hindsight bias in informant-based search warrant cases. The
study's authors posit that judges use "rules of thumb" for analyzing
probable cause scenarios, such as refusing to issue warrants or admit
evidence when the only basis for the search was vague assertions by
officers about having smelled drugs in a vehicle; these rules of thumb
may minimize the effect of the search results on judges.280 In a later
article, the study's authors similarly suggested that the complexity of
legal rules in Fourth Amendment cases would stimulate more careful
reflective decision-making rather than quick intuitive decisions that
create greater room for hindsight bias. 2 81 But these explanations actually
suggest that judges may be more vulnerable to hindsight bias in
informant situations than in the scenario in this study. The case law
274. Id. at 1317.
275. See id. at 1315.
276. Id. at 1324.
277. Id.
278. See, e.g., Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 236 (1983) ("A magistrate's determination of
probable cause should be paid great deference by reviewing courts.") (internal quotation omitted).
279. See supra Part II.D. (regarding the inadequacy of review in Franks cases) and Bowman,
supra note 20 (regarding motions to suppress reviewed for adequacy of probable cause
determinations).
280. Wistrich et al., supra note 117, at 1324.
281. Guthrie et al., Blinking, supra note 262, at 27, 29. That explanation is related to, but
distinct from, the first explanation, in that the former emphases mental shortcuts by individual
judges, while the later relates more to effects from the formality of the legal doctrine coming from
higher courts' decisions. Compare Wistrich et al., supra note 117, at 1318 (describing informal
heuristics of individual judges), with Guthrie et al., Blinking, supra note 262, at 27 (referring to
"[t]he highly intricate, rule-bound nature of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence that guides probable
cause determinations").
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suggests that judges use overly simplistic rules of thumb when assessing
informants' reliability, a key component of the probable cause
determination based on informant tips. 28 2 For example, courts often rely
on the fact that an informant has made a statement against penal interests
in establishing the informant's veracity, without ensuring that the
More
statement actually is against the informant's interests. 2 83
troublingly, they often assert that informants' statements are more likely
to be reliable when the informant is under arrest and seeking a potential
"deal" in exchange for information, when that situation incentivizes the
informant to pass along rumors or even lies rather than just truthful
information.284 In both situations, the use of rough heuristics cuts
against the sort of detailed factual analysis that is required for analyzing
these issues. 285
In fact, hindsight bias provides a plausible partial explanation for
the fact that defendants almost never win Franks cases involving
informants, particularly given the structure of the Franks test, which
creates significant opportunities for hindsight bias to affect the courts'
decisions. Hindsight bias is particularly likely to affect decision-making
when the defendant bears a substantial burden of persuasion.286 The
Franks test begins with the presumption of the warrant's validity and
stresses the heavy burden the defendant bears in overcoming that
287
presumption.
Similarly, the test reinforces that tendency by requiring
the defendant to make a "substantial preliminary showing," before being
able to get an evidentiary hearing on Franks allegations. 2 88 Thus, the
reviewing court's assessment of the merits of the Franks challenge on
appeal can be colored by the failure of the defendant's Franks challenge
and the defendant's conviction below.
In fact, some Franks cases suggest hindsight biases may be
affecting courts' decisions. 2 89 For example, in United States v. Tzannos,
282. See generally, Bowman, supra note 20 (arguing that the courts should more carefully
scrutinize the role that informants' statements against penal interests play in establishing the
informants' veracity).
283. Id. at 249-52.
284. Id. at 261-65.
285. See id.
286. Findley & Scott, supranote 9, at 322.
287. Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 171 (1978).
288. See, e.g., United States v. Rosario-Marando, 537 F. Supp. 2d 299 (D.P.R. 2008) (to be
entitled to a Frankshearing, a defendant must do more than construct a self-serving statement that
refutes the warrant affidavit).
289. The cases described in this part do not definitively demonstrate cognitive bias, as that
conclusion cannot be made from the information available in appellate opinions. Instead, the cases
illustrate things that would be predictable based on cognitive bias research, whether or not that was
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the First Circuit's reasoning suggested hindsight bias may have affected
its rejection of the adequacy of the showing that the defendant made
suggesting that the affiant officer had made a materially false statement
deliberately or with reckless disregard for the truth.29 0 The officer stated
in his affidavit that he had participated in a controlled call regarding
gambling, in which he called the target number and listened while the
confidential informant discussed betting. 29 1 The trial court found
credible the defendant's evidence that no such call was made on the day
in question.292 The appellate court, on the other hand, focused on the
substantive accuracy of the informant's information about the gambling
operation that was discovered in the search; the appellate court criticized
the defendant for failing to explain how the officer "would have
obtained such detailed and accurate information" if the informant had
been fabricated.293 Those considerations are improper because the
informant's information only turned out to be accurate in hindsight, after
the execution of the search warrant, but the search has to be justified at
its inception, not based on what turns up in the search.294
IV. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS

The problems identified above are multifaceted, so the solutions
need to be similarly multifaceted. As discussed below, however, all
these solutions generally revolve around the idea of full disclosure,
making sure that all actors in the system have needed information about
cognitive bias and making sure that magistrates and judges receive
adequate information about the specific cases before them.2 95 None of

really the cause of what happened in any individual case. But the reasoning in these cases suggests
that cognitive bias may have contributed to the courts' decisions. Moreover, the cases also suggest
that although not all Franks cases are wrongly decided, the current doctrine is inadequate to provide
defendants with a meaningful remedy when cognitive biases are at play.
290. United States v. Tzannos, 460 F.3d 128, 138 (1st Cir. 2006).
291. Id. at 131.
292. See id. at 133 (regarding granting the hearing) and 134 (discussing trial court's evaluation
of issues). The appellate court raised some reasonable points about the quality of the evidence, see
id. at 137, but the defendant's evidence did directly contradict the officer's version of events.
293. Id. at 138. In doing so, the appellate court found clear error in the trial court's
conclusions, rather than reaching this decision under a de novo standard of review, despite the
appellate court's lack of deference to the trial court's interpretation of the facts. See id.
294. See, e.g., New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341 (1985) (search must be justified at its
inception). The officer in Tzannos could not have mistakenly relied on the informant for bad
information, as the key disputed statement in the case turned on the officer's own involvement in
the controlled call, so the appellate court was wrong in concluding that the defendant had not met
the preliminary showing required by Franks. See Tzannos, 460 F.3d at 138.
295. See supranote 35 (regarding "full disclosure" versus "adequate disclosure").
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the suggested solutions will work in isolation, but the combination of
these reforms should help provide magistrates with better information in
search warrant applications, should help magistrates review that
information more effectively, and should make later judicial review of
magistrate's decisions more thoughtful.
A. Educate Police, Magistrates,and Judges about Cognitive Bias and
the Value ofFull Disclosure
Increased education for police, magistrates, and judges is a helpful
first step, although only a first step, in minimizing the effect of cognitive
bias on probable cause evaluations of search warrant applications.
Education about cognitive bias does not in itself ensure that people will
overcome these biases, and some biases are quite difficult to overcome,
even when people are aware of them. 29 6 However, research shows that
increased awareness of cognitive processes that lead to bias can lead to
improved decision-making in some circumstances, 297 particularly when
coupled with the adoption of additional techniques to help apply the
research and improve decision-making. 298 This education should cover
both cognitive biases generally and the value of full disclosure in the
search warrant context more specifically.
1. Education about Cognitive Bias Generally
Many scholars who write about cognitive bias have called for
increased judicial education about cognition, which has been relatively
uncontroversial even if not yet adopted on a widespread basis. 2 99 For
example, Professor Rachlinski suggests that judges should be exposed
296. See, e.g., Findley & Scott, supra note 9, at 371 (discussing, for example, the difficulty
people have in correcting for hindsight bias, even when they are aware of it and are specifically told
to ignore outcome information).
297. Burke, Neutralizing Cognitive Bias, supra note 8, at 522 ("Some empirical evidence
suggests that education can potentially mitigate bias, especially if the education focuses on the
cognitive processes that can lead to bias."). Education is not a panacea, however, and needs to be
coupled with additional strategies, as discussed infra. See id. at 523.
298. See, e.g., Weinstein, supra note 203, at 822 (noting that "teaching about [framing] bias is
less effective than training people to analyze problems differently"); Findley & Scott, supra note 9,
at 372-74 (discussing numerous suggests for ways that police officers could approach decisions
differently).
299. See, e.g., Roberts, supra note 7 at 858-75 (summarizing various proposals for educating
jurors about implicit bias, including drawing on work done with judges and others, and offering
proposal for how such education should be conducted to be most effective); Jeffrey W. Stempel,
Refocusing Away from Rules Reform and Devoting More Attention to the Deciders,87 DENV. U. L.
REv. 335, 363-64 (2010) (noting that proposals regarding educating judges about cognitive bias are
relatively uncontroversial but have yet to achieve widespread adoption).
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both to general information about implicit biases and to more specific
information about their own vulnerability to implicit bias.3 00 Similarly,
the Honorable John Irwin has advocated for increased awareness by
other judges of the role implicit bias can play in decision-making, as a
way to help judges guard against it. 30 ' Professors Findley and Scott
have similarly advocated for education of lawyers and judges, beginning
in law school, about both the causes and solutions for tunnel vision. 302
Some judicial training regarding cognitive biases has begun to be
offered, 303 but it should be expanded.
Other sources advocate for increased education of other participants
in the criminal justice system. For example, some within the police
community have embraced the call for increased education into
cognitive biases and how they affect police work. 304 Furthermore,
Professor Alafair Burke has written extensively about the need to
educate prosecutors on cognitive biases and their influences on
prosecutorial decision-making. 305 Professor Burke has also correctly
stressed that education about cognitive bias is helpful in overcoming the
tendency to demonize those involved in the criminal justice system,
which is often counterproductive if the real goal is to improve the
system. 306 The same principles apply here.
300. Rachlinski et al., supra note 127, at 1228 ("Therefore, while education regarding implicit
bias as a general matter might be useful, specific training revealing the vulnerabilities of the judges
being trained would be more useful.").
301. Irwin & Real, supra note 120, at 7 (noting that judicial education "affords judges one
more opportunity to carefully consider all aspects of the decision to reach the most correct
outcome"); id. at 8 ("Training about implicit biases in general, how they most likely influence
judicial decision-making and how their impact can be minimized, could become an important first
aspect of the ever-growing world ofjudicial education.").
302. Findley & Scott, supra note 9, at 374-75.
303. See, e.g., Raymond J. McKoski, Reestablishing Actual Impartiality as the Fundamental
Value of Judicial Ethics: Lessons from "Big Judge Davis," 99 KY. L.J. 259, 309-10 (2011)
(describing judicial education programs dealing with cognitive bias offered by the University of
North Carolina, the National Judicial College, and Judge Mark Bennett).
304. See, e.g., Robert B. Bates, Curing Investigative Tunnel Vision, 54 POLICE CHIEF 41, 42
(1987), available at http://www.policechiefmagazine.org/magazine/index.cfm?fuseaction=display
arch&article id=2578&issue id=12012 (discussing "law enforcement leadership initiatives and
training programs" to address ways in which officers sometimes "cut comers" and to help officers
"understand what is driving their decisions" in certain situations). While embracing the idea that
cognitive bias can affect police actions, the author unfortunately rejects the idea that racial bias
could play a similar role, without confronting or responding to the research on implicit racial bias,
which further underscores the need for increased education and training.
305. See Burke, ProsecutorialPassion, supra note 115; Burke, Neutralizing Cognitive Bias,
supra note 8.
306. Alafair S. Burke, New Perspectives on Brady and Other Disclosure Obligations: What
Really Works? Talking About Prosecutors, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 2119, 2120 (2010) [hereinafter
Burke, Talking About Prosecutors] ("The wrongful conviction literature's dominant rhetoric about
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2. Education about the Value of Full Disclosure
However, this education should go beyond a general introduction to
cognitive biases, to cover the value of full disclosure for combatting
these biases.307 The most important of the reforms discussed in this
article is genuine acceptance of the ideas that magistrate review of
search warrant applications is valuable, not just an inconvenience. 308
Providing full disclosure can improve police decision-making. 3 09
Furthermore, police officers cannot be expected to overcome all their
cognitive biases themselves, so it is important to get magistrates the
information that they need to play a meaningful role in the process. 310
Providing meaningful review by magistrates, and then meaningful
appellate review of magistrate decisions, can provide other systemic
benefits as well.3 "
a. Benefits to Police and Magistrate Decision-Making
The process of articulating a more complete picture of a case to the
magistrate should help minimize officers' tendencies towards tunnel
vision.
An empirical study into confirmation bias and police
investigation suggested that participants who were asked to discuss
evidence for and against their hypotheses did not show confirmation
bias, much like the participants who were not asked to name a suspect at
prosecutors-a rhetoric of fault-is counterproductive because it alienates the very parties who hold
the power to initiate many of the most promising reforms of the movement: prosecutors. Fault-based
discourse is especially misplaced in the discussion of the disclosure of evidence to the defense").
307. Findley & Scott, supra note 9, at 371-72 ("In general, police and prosecutor training
needs to place greater value on neutrality, emphasizing the need to postpone judgment, and to
develop all the facts rather than merely building a case against a suspect.").
308. VAN DUIZEND ET AL., supra note 57, at 75 (some officers view the search warrant
requirement as an unnecessary intrusion by the courts into what they consider law enforcement's
domain; therefore the warrant requirement "is largely something to be 'gotten around"'); Bar-Gill &
Friedman, supra note 14, at 1614 ("Facing scrutiny from a magistrate is almost certainly calculated
to avoid some searches that would not meet Fourth Amendment requisites."). See also Bates, supra
note 304, at 43 (noting from the police perspective that "[alnyone can attend training, but the
leadership and the culture of the department must allow for an investigative atmosphere" that
embraces rather than is hostile to questioning and healthy debate).
309. See infra Part IV.A.2.a.
310. Findley & Scott, supra note 9, at 390 ("Given that police and prosecutors, because they
are human, cannot be expected to recognize and correct for all of their natural biases, the system
must find a way to give sufficient case information to those who have different incentives and
different natural biases."); Bar-Gill & Friedman, supra note 14, at 1641 ("Without regard to the
quality of magistrates, a real warrant requirement will force some police officials to stop and think,
and to articulate their reasons for intruding into someone's liberty, thereby avoiding unreasonable
intrusions in the first place.").
311. See infra Part IV.A.2.a.
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all, 312 but participants who were asked to name one or more suspects and
articulate the reasons supporting their analysis did show these biases.3 13
The study's author suggested that "the extra step of actively considering
evidence that points away from that suspect shows promise as a simple
way to counteract bias."314 Thus, when officers are accountable for
carefully and thoroughly investigating, and when they are required to
provide a more complete picture of the information they have gathered,
as discussed in the next part, the officers may be more able to counteract
their tendencies toward confirmation bias and selective information
processing.315
Similarly, full disclosure should improve police analysis by
increasing accountability. 3 16 Research into accountability shows that
"when people know in advance that they will have to justify a decision
to a well-informed audience, they tend to consider evidence in a way
that is both more evenhanded and thorough, and they are less influenced
by previous beliefs."317 The effect is particularly strong when the
audience's views are unknown and could be skeptical of the offered
position.3 18
Accountability is especially important in overcoming
priming and implicit bias. 3 19 Therefore, when police know magistrates
will provide meaningful review of the information provided, they are
likely to perform a more thorough analysis than when they expect
magistrates to rubber stamp the warrant application.3 20
Magistrate decision-making should also benefit. Magistrates are
obviously somewhat vulnerable to cognitive biases, as they are
human. 32 1 But as discussed above, magistrates should be less vulnerable
312. O'Brien, Prime Suspect, supra note 30, at 329.
313. Id. at 327-28.
314. Id. at 329.
315. See Taslitz, Police Are People Too, supra note 29, at 34.
316. See Findley & Scott, supra note 9, at 391.
317. See O'Brien, RecipeforBias, supra note 159, at 1018-19.
318. See id. at 1019.
319. See Stanchi, supra note 205, at 348-49 (citing Jennifer S. Lerner et al., Sober Second
Thought: The Effects of Accountability, Anger, and Authoritarianism on Attributions of
Responsibility, 24 PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. BULL. 563, 564 (1998) (describing a study
involving accountability and priming)).
320. See O'Brien, Recipe for Bias, supra note 159, at J019. See also Bar-Gill & Friedman,
supra note 14, at 1670-72 (arguing that police decision-making will be improved by increased
magistrate review of warrants, including based on reasons related to combatting cognitive biases).
321. See, e.g., Chris Guthrie, Misjudging, 7 NEv. L.J. 420, 428-38 (2007) (discussing in detail
how judges are affected by anchoring, hindsight bias, and "self-serving bias"). Another study
indicated that judges are no better than police officers or prosecutors in detecting lies, although
judges were far more willing to indicate that they did not know the answers to study questions than
were officers or prosecutors. Leif A. Strimwall & Pdr Anders Granhag, How to Detect Deception:
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to tunnel vision than police officers, given their different roles in the
system.322 Some empirical evidence suggests that judges are in fact able
to resist at least some cognitive biases.323 Magistrates will be more
effectively able to resist their own cognitive bias when they appreciate
the importance of their role.
An important way to combat magistrates' cognitive biases is to
strengthen appellate review of magistrate decisions, as discussed in more
detail in Part IV.C below. The research on accountability is equally
- - -*
* *
324
applicable to decisions by magistrates as it is to police decisions.
Yet
the current judicial review of magistrate decisions is often too
deferential, such that it is very difficult for defendants to win these
challenges. 3 25
Judicial review of magistrate decisions will be
particularly valuable if it focuses on the ways magistrates reach
decisions or their reasoning, not just the bare conclusion about whether
or not the warrant should issue. 3 26
b. Systemic Benefits from Increased Transparency
Full disclosure can have other beneficial effects as well, including
facilitating meaningful review by defense counsel once charges are filed
and they are retained. Professor Natapoff has noted the important role
defense counsel plays in revealing "informant excesses." 32 7 She argues
that "defense counsel should have more and earlier access to information
about informants, including their complete criminal records, any
cooperation provided in or promised in any other cases, copies of any
statements made regarding the case, and a description of all promisesimplicit and explicit-made by the government."3 28 In United States v.
Arresting the Beliefs of Police Officers, Prosecutorsand Judges, 9 PSYCHOL. CRIME & LAW I, 1936 (2003).
322. See supra Part Ill.B2, Il.C.
323. See supra notes 269-74 and accompanying text (discussing the research into judicial
resistance to hindsight bias in the context of probable cause determinations) and notes 216-18 and
accompanying text (discussing judicial resistance to racial bias when race is explicit rather than
implicit).
324. See supra notes 316-20 and related text (regarding accountability).
325. See supra Part II.D.
326. See O'Brien, Recipe for Bias, supra note 159, at 1020 (accountability for decisions'
ultimate outcomes can increase bias, but accountability for the decision-making process reduces
bias by leading to more thorough evaluation of alternatives and less commitment to earlier
decisions); Bar-Gill & Friedman, supra note 14, at 1639 (noting that magistrates are motivated by
the threat of later reversal of their decisions, so judicial review of those decisions "helps align a
magistrate's incentives with the social optimum.").
327. Natapoff, Snitching, supra note 15, at 699.
328. Id.
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Ruiz, the Supreme Court recently narrowed prosecutor's obligations to
provide discovery of this type of information, holding that defendants
who plead guilty are not entitled to this discovery. 3 29 If the search
warrant application more routinely contained such information, that
would minimize the negative effects of Ruiz on the criminal cases
involving search warrants. 33 0
Providing magistrates with additional information in search warrant
applications would also have the added benefit of making the system
more transparent and easier to study. Researchers have noted the
challenges of getting access to meaningful information in the search
warrants,33' and several scholars have called for the need for more
transparent access to information about informants. 33 2 Improved access
to information about informant usage in search warrant cases could help
make it easier to monitor for racial disparities, which in turn could help
with both perceived and actual accountability, important in reducing
implicit bias. 333 "In the end, greater transparency at all stages of the
criminal process is the most powerful way to counter tunnel vision." 3 34
B. FacilitateFull Disclosure Through Use of a Checklist
Of course, magistrates can only take a "fresh look" 3 35 at search
warrant applications if they are given enough information about the
facts. 336 Police should therefore be incentivized "to collect more of the

329. United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622 (2002).
330. See Natapoff, Snitching, supra note 15, at 699 n.236 ("Since 90-95% of defendants plead
guilty, [Ruiz] effectively shields from discovery vast amounts of data related to informant
credibility.")
331. See, e.g., VAN DUIZEND ETAL., supra note 57, at 1-2.
332. See, e.g., Natapoff, Snitching, supra note 15, at 697 ("Access to information about the
informant institution would temper law enforcement discretion and permit public consideration of a
variety of important and painful decisions about what substantive limits, if any, should be placed on
informant use.") (internal quotations omitted).
333. See Smith & Levinson, supra note 123, at 824-25. That is particularly important because
there is no individual remedy for implicit bias, as noted above.
334. Findley & Scott, supra note 9, at 390. See also Bandes, Loyalty to One's Convictions,
supra note 34, at 494 (arguing that prosecutorial tunnel vision should be combatted through
transparency, including increased "record keeping, record sharing and discovery ... to ensure that a
full investigative record exists and is accessible for review.").
335. Cf Burke, Neutralizing Cognitive Bias, supra note 8, at 525-27 (arguing for the use of
internal and external mechanisms for prosecutors and others to take a "fresh look" at other
prosecutors' decisions in order to neutralize cognitive biases).
336. Cf Findley, supra note 1, at 939 (noting the importance of making the investigation
process more transparent to fact-finders, which will improve the quality of the outcomes of the
adjudicative process).
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reasonably available information before acting."337 One way to facilitate
fuller collection and disclosure of case-specific information to the
magistrate would be to encourage the use of a checklist. 33 8 A checklist
would clarify for both police and magistrates what evidence should be
collected and disclosed, which would make the idea of full disclosure
easier to implement and enforce. 33 9 Empirical studies of search warrant
applications also show that some police departments have already
developed and used standardized forms, including checklists, to help
increase efficiency
and precision in search warrant applications. 340
Checklists have been recognized as helpful for police in other
contexts. 34 1 For example, the ABA's Working Group regarding
improving Brady disclosures concluded that checklists should be used
"to ensure full and timely transfer of all relevant information from police
to prosecutors."342 Police members of that Working Group advocated
for the use of checklists to help them comply with their disclosure
obligations.343 Similarly, another ABA report urged the judiciary to
adopt checklists to help ensure compliance with Brady disclosures as
part of its recommendations for ways to prevent wrongful convictions. 344

337. Taslitz, What Is Probable Cause, supra note 24, at 171. I am not arguing that use of the
checklist would necessarily be required to do additional investigation in most cases. Instead, I
expect that in routine cases, officers would do the same sort of investigation as is currently done but
would disclose more of that information to magistrates. Of course, if using the checklist indicated
to officers that they had not yet done enough to establish probable cause, then they could continue
to investigate.
338. See infra Part IV.C regarding police incentives for use of a checklist.
339. See Lissa Griffin, Pretrial Procedures for Innocent People: ReJbrming Brady, 56 N.Y.L.
ScH. L. REV. 969, 974 (2011/12) (discussing the same benefits from using a checklist to help
improve Brady disclosures). Use of a checklist may have the most tangible effects on individual
cases.
340. See VAN DUIZEND ET AL., supra note 57, at 51 (regarding standardized forms); Uchida &
Bynum, supra note 15, at 1056 (regarding police-developed checklist in one jurisdiction that
included information about informant reliability).
341. New Perspectives on Brady and Other Disclosure Obligations: Report of the Working
Groups on Best Practices, 31 CARDOZo L. REV. 1961, 1975 (2010) [hereinafter Report of the
Working Group]. See also Corey Fleming Hirokawa, Comment, Making the "Law ofthe Land" the
Law on the Street: How Police Academies Teach Evolving Fourth Amendment Law, 49 EMORY L.J.
295, 317 (2000) (noting that even in jurisdictions that use the Gates test, officers are trained using
checklists based on Aguilar-Spinelli).
342. Report of the Working Group, supra note 341, at 1974.
343. Id. at 1975 ("police experts in the Working Group noted that police generally want to do
a good job, and that, because police tend to be rule driven, formal rules can help them in their
efforts to do a good job. Police are greatly assisted by having clear expectations and written
rules.").
344. See Griffin, supra note 339, at 986. See also Gouldin, supra note 58, at 1380-81
(discussing use of checklists to improve decision-making, including a recent project in the
Manhattan District Attorney's Office to create conviction integrity programs using similar
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A checklist to facilitate disclosure of information in a search
warrant application should help police combat investigative tunnel
vision 34 5 and make police analysis of disclosure obligations more
systematic. 346 Imposing a clear structure regarding what information
should be compiled and disclosed can help counter cognitive biases like
confirmation bias and selective information processing. 347 That in turn
should help police build stronger cases. 34 8 Similarly, research from
Continuous Quality Improvement efforts in healthcare demonstrate that
improved performance is more likely to result from systems that provide
support for performing a job correctly, rather than using threats to punish
poor performance; the ABA Working Group on Brady disclosures
pointed out that checklists serve that function well.34 9
The checklist should be helpful for magistrates as well. The major
empirical study on search warrants noted that magistrates reviewing
search warrant applications often used "mental checklists" to verify that
the application contained all necessary information.35 o Confirmation
bias makes it hard, however, to notice what is missing, as it leads people
to seek information that confirms rather than challenges an existing
hypothesis. 35 1 Therefore, a checklist can help overcome the potentially
significant burden of evaluating the specifics of each case to determine
what information should have been available and disclosed.352 The
checklist may also help overcome some of the dangers of priming and
implicit bias discussed above, 3 53 as information would be presented in a
more standardized way rather than focusing so much on the officer's
theory of the case.354
principles).
345. See Report ofthe Working Group, supra note 341, at 1975.
346. See Griffin, supra note 339, at 997 (regarding creating systematic way to ensure
information sharing).
347. See Report of the Working Group, supra note 341, at 1975. See also Burke, Talking
About Prosecutors, supra note 306, at 2132 (discussing how prosecutors can be subject to tunnel
vision because they are focused only on their own theory of the case, which may affect their ability
to recognize the value of potentially exculpatory evidence).
348. Report ofthe Working Group, supra note 341, at 1976.
349. Id. at 1974-75.
350. See VAN DUIZEND ET AL., supra note 57, at 51.
351. See Findley & Scott, supra note 9, at 309.
352. See Tim Bakken, Models ofJustice to Protect Innocent Persons, 56 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV.
837, 857 (2011/12) (discussing the analogous benefit of use of a checklist in Brady disclosures).
353. See supra Part 1I.A and III.C. See also Smith & Levinson, supra note 123, at 815-16
(discussing the ways in which implicit bias may affect prosecutorial analysis of Brady disclosures;
the same points could easily apply to police evaluation of information that could be included in a
search warrant application).
354. See O'Brien, Recipe for Bias, supra note 159, at 1045-46 (discussing "groupthink" and
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Appendix A to this article proposes a sample checklist that could be
used for search warrant applications based on informant tips. The
contents of that checklist are drawn from my prior article, Truth or
Consequences: Self-Incriminating Statements and Informant Veracity,
which argued that magistrates should consider a variety of factors when
assessing an informant's veracity, 3 55 as well as on information from
other sources.356 It also draws on the Franks cases discussed above in
Part III, regarding the types of information that defendants argued was
omitted but should have been included in search warrant applications.
Much of the information in the checklist relates to the informant's
credibility, which is crucial for making sure magistrates make good
probable cause determinations and for minimizing the likelihood that the
informant will provide false information to the officers.3 57 Of particular
importance is information about any benefits the informant expects to
receive 35 8 and the informant's perceived risk for providing inaccurate
information.359
Perhaps the most controversial item in the sample checklist is the
inclusion of questions about the race of both the informant and the
suspect. That information was included based on the implicit bias
research that suggests that judges control implicit bias better when race
is explicit rather than implicit. 3 60 Although the research suggests that
making race explicit may help individuals make better decisions in some
circumstances, I am not arguing that just including race in search
warrant documents would remove all taint from implicit bias. Instead,
including that information will provide greater transparency and access
to information about the role that race and implicit bias might play, as

studies of Dutch independent crime analysts who showed more true independence when they were
shielded from primary investigator's theory of the case than when they could tell the investigator's
theory).
355. See generally Bowman, supranote 20.
356. 1also drew on Griffin, supra note 339, Natapoff, Beyond Unreliable,supra note 196, and
Mosteller, supra note 28, all of which provided useful information about special concerns related to
criminal informants.
357. See supra notes 184-96 and accompanying text regarding the risks of informants shading
testimony based on what police want to hear and the reasons that police and prosecutors may not
detect these problems.
358. See Mosteller, supra note 28, at 572 (proposing a reliability hearing for testifying
informants, focusing on any promises or inducements); Natapoff, Beyond Unreliable, supra note
196, at 114-15 (proposing similar reliability hearing for testifying informants, with a slightly
broader range of material covered).
359. See Bowman, supra note 20, at Part Ill.C.4.
360. See supra notes 219-21 and accompanying text. See also Rachlinski et al., supra note
127, at 1225 ("Control of implicit bias requires active, conscious control.").
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that information is currently very hard to obtain. 36 1 If this increased
access to racial data does demonstrate that either explicit or implicit
biaS3 62 is really occurring, that data would help people identify
additional solutions.363
But the checklist in Appendix A is really intended merely as a
starting point for helping each jurisdiction to develop its own
checklists. 364 It might be helpful, for example, to have police,
prosecutors, magistrates, and defense attorneys weigh in on the
particular content and terminology that would be most helpful in a
particular jurisdiction.365 Multiple checklists may also be helpful to deal
with different types of crimes and different sources of information about
the crimes; the one in Appendix A deals with search warrants based on
informant tips, but it other checklists could be developed for situations
involving different types of information.366
Of course, use of a checklist should not be confused with
acceptance of boilerplate language. As discussed above, officers
361. See supra Part IV.A.2.b regarding systemic benefits from increased transparency.
362. It is possible, of course, that making race explicit could exacerbate existing explicit racial
bias. Although that is certainly a risk, I am persuaded by the arguments throughout the research
discussed in this article that implicit rather than explicit bias is likely to be the most significant
problem at this point. Furthermore, increased access to racial data may help reveal the likely effects
of either type of bias, compared to the currently available information.
363. This article only scratches the surface on the problems of racial bias in the criminal
justice system, and the reforms suggested here will play at best a small role in addressing those
issues. See, e.g., Research Working Group & Task Force on Race, the Criminal Justice System,
Preliminary Report on Race and Washington's Criminal Justice System, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV.
623, 626 (2012) (detailing several ways that race affects the criminal justice system in Washington,
"to serve as a basis for making recommendations for changes to promote fairness, reduce disparity,
ensure legitimate public safety objectives, and instill public confidence in our criminal justice
system."). Obviously, the broad-based solutions to the larger problem are beyond the scope of this
article, but my hope is that the discussion here of the social cognitive underpinnings of the search
warrant problems above can provide a useful foundation for others' suggested solutions. See, e.g.,
Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1489, 1496-97 (2005) (arguing that social
cognition research can be used to complement other methodologies of critical race studies and that
modem newscast focus on crime is a "Trojan horse" that exacerbates implicit bias tendencies); and
Johnson, supra note 138, at 361 (arguing for the importance of coalition building between AfricanAmericans and Latinalos to address the problem of racial profiling).
364. See Griffin, supra note 339, at 997 ("Certainly, as recommended by the ABA, each
jurisdiction could develop its own checklist. The proposed checklist in Appendix C is offered to
assist this effort.").
365. See id. at 986 (discussing a similar recommendation in the ABA report on wrongful
convictions).
366. Report of the Working Group, supra note 341, at 1976 ("A case involving an
informant ... for example, might uniquely require inquiry into information such as prior cases in
which the witness acted as an informant, prior deals bestowed upon the witness in other cases, prior
record and dispositions in earlier cases, any recorded communications between the informant and
others, and other such information related to the witness's incentives and veracity.").
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sometimes use the same language in many search warrant applications,
and magistrates sometimes focus more on whether all the expected
boilerplate has been included rather than on the lack of specific facts
from which to make a meaningful review. 3 67 Reliance on boilerplate can
have significant negative consequences.368 Thus, the checklist in
Appendix A and any subsequent checklists developed in particular
jurisdictions should require that police fill in the details related to the
items in the checklist, rather than merely checking boxes. 69 After all,
the case-specific details, rather than the general categories, are necessary
for magistrates to provide meaningful review.
C. DoctrinalReform to FacilitateDefense Counsel's Challenges to
Warrant Validity
"[T]o the extent that existing legal rules enforce tunnel vision,
doctrinal reform is an obvious place to begin." 3 70 Many scholars who
write about cognitive bias in the criminal justice system stress the
importance of vigorous defense counsel in combatting that bias. 371 But
because search warrants are issued ex parte, defense counsel can only
have a meaningful role if reviewing courts provide meaningful
assessment of the search warrants.372 For that to happen, the Franks
doctrine discussed above in Part II.D needs to be modified at least in
some respects.
1. Reform to the Preliminary Showing Required Under Franks for
Informant Cases
As explained above, most courts interpret the "preliminary
showing" required under Franks in a way that makes it virtually
impossible for the defendant to meet the standard when the affidavit is
based primarily on information from a confidential informant.3 73 That
367. See supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text.
368. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
369. For example, the affiant would have to give details about any promises made to the
informant, rather than just noting that there had been such a promise. Similarly, the afflant would
need to give some detail about the circumstances under which the police contacted the informant
and any prior inconsistent statements the informant might have made. Requiring the police to
provide details, rather than just generalizations, also helps remove the current incentives for
"testifying," which is charitably described as shading the facts so that a search will be found to be
justified. See, e.g., Bar-Gill & Friedman, supra note 14, at 1624-25.
370. Findley & Scott, supranote 9, at 354.
371. See, e.g., Findley, supranote 1, at 935-36.
372. See supra notes 30-33 and accompanying text.
373. See supra Part 1I.DI.
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standard is problematic not only because it incentivizes creation of
fictitious informants,3 74 but also because it fails to provide the kind of
meaningful accountability that helps overcome tunnel vision.375
Thus, courts should adopt a standard used in Washington for such
cases: an in-camera hearing should be conducted to examine the affiant
and/or confidential informant if (1) the defendant offers information that
"casts a reasonable doubt on the veracity of material representations
made by a search warrant affiant," and (2) "the challenged statements
[related to information from a confidential informant] are the sole basis
for probable cause to issue the search warrant."376 That standard
provides a clearer and more realistic metric for judging the sufficiency
of the defendant's showing, by use of the "casts a reasonable doubt"
language. Furthermore, the standard only applies to cases in which the
confidential informant's information is really the sole basis for the
search warrant affidavit; in other cases, the defendant can attack the
affidavit by challenging the rest of the information presented. This
approach would only allow the defendant to receive an in-camera
hearing to test the affiant's (or informant's) credibility; it would not
require suppression or otherwise change the showing required under
Franks for the defendant to actually win his or her challenge.3 77 Instead,
it would simply deal with the inherent impossibility of meeting the
preliminary showing standard in informant cases, which insulates both
deliberate wrongdoing and tunnel vision.
2. How Use or Non-Use of a Checklist Should Affect Subsequent
Review
Additionally, the courts should analyze Franks omissions cases
differently than they currently do, and that new analysis should depend
in part on whether a checklist was used. The new analysis should
incentivize police to use the proposed checklist, and it should provide
the police with more favorable review when that checklist is used.378
374. See supra notes 93-95 and accompanying text.
375. See supra notes 316-20 and accompanying text about accountability.
376. State v. Casal, 699 P.2d 1234, 1235 (Wash. 1985) (emphasis in original); id. at 1238
(distinguishing between cases where the informant's identity is known and where the informant's
identity is kept confidential).
377. "An in-camera hearing serves to protect the interests of both the government and the
defendant; the Government can be protected from any significant, unnecessary impairment of
secrecy, yet the defendant can be saved from what could be serious police misconduct." Id. at 1238
(internal quotation omitted).
378. The doctrine on review of search warrant applications must be crafted so that police have
incentives to seek search warrant applications rather than perform warrantless searches and hope an
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If police use the checklist in connection with the search warrant
affidavit, then the existing presumption of the warrant's validity should
still attach. 9 If the affiant failed to provide information that was asked
for in the checklist, then the defendant should have the burden of
showing that the police knew or should have known that information. 380
The fact that the checklist asked for the information should remove the
inquiry about whether the information was material, which has caused
significant problems in the Franks omissions cases. 3 8 1 The checklist
would clarify the police disclosure obligations, in answer to concerns
about police having to speculate about what information might matter. 3 82
The officers would not have a duty to gather additional information, but
the checklist would help clarify for police what information they should
consider and disclose if that information was available. And the
defendant would then still bear the not-insignificant burden of showing
that the officer-affiant actually knew or should have known the omitted
information.
In such circumstances, the defendant should have
increased access to in-camera review to explore this possibility, as
discussed in the part above, but the defendant would still be required to
make a substantial showing, and if the defendant could not meet that
burden, then the defendant's Franks claim would fail.
However, if defendant does show that the police knew or should
have known information called for in the checklist but failed to disclose
that information, then the burden should shift to the State to show that
the failure to disclose the information was harmless because it would not

exception to the warrant requirement will allow admission of the resulting evidence. See United
States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102 (1965) (noting the effect that reviewing courts' attitudes can have
on officers' willingness to seek warrants).
379. See Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 171 (1978) (courts should presume the validity of
the warrant and defendant should have to come forward with specific allegations and an offer of
proof to defeat that presumption).
380. In some jurisdictions at least, the affiant officer often lacks first-hand knowledge of the
contents of the investigation. See supra note 67 and accompanying text. It would be preferable if
the affiant had firsthand knowledge of the investigative information gathered, but the defendant
should not get caught in a trap regarding showing who knew what information. Instead, the
defendant should only have to show that investigators involved in the case knew or should have
known relevant omitted information; the defendant should not have to make a heightened showing
regarding the extent of communication between officers involved in the investigation.
381. See supra notes 228-234 and accompanying text (discussing corroboration, which is often
key to materiality analysis).
382. See United States v. Colkley, 889 F.2d 297, 301 (4th Cir. 1990) (justifying the increased
skepticism of Franks omissions cases in part because of an unacceptable risk that officers would be
open to "endless conjecture about investigative leads, fragments of information, or other matter that
might, if included, have redounded to defendant's benefit.").
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have changed the magistrate's probable cause analysis.m The court
could still find that the information was not material, perhaps because of
police corroboration of the informant's tip, other evidence of the
informant's reliability, or because the informant's tip only played a
small part in the overall showing of probable cause. But the prosecutor
would bear the burden of proof of demonstrating probable cause, rather
than the current situation that puts the burden on the defendant to defeat
probable cause.
In cases in which a checklist was used but the defendant objected to
the failure to disclose information that was not called for by the
checklist, then the current standards would still remain in place. That is,
the defendant would still have to prove that the omission was both
material and intentionally or recklessly designed to mislead.38 4 That
standard would likely be difficult to meet, as it is now, although courts
should still make a more careful and nuanced inquiry into those issues,
as discussed above in Part III.B.2, and the defendant should be able to
get in-camera review if needed, as discussed above in Part IV.C.1.
If officers did not use a checklist, however, then the standards
should be more favorable to the defendant. The court should presume
that the affiant knew that the kind of information called for by the
checklist could be material to the probable cause determination.
Therefore, if the affiant failed to use the checklist and the defendant
made a substantial preliminary showing that the undercut the affiant's
version, as discussed above in the previous subsection, then the police
should bear the burden of proof regarding both intent (whether the police
intended to mislead) and materiality (whether the information matters to
the probable cause determination). With respect to intent, the police
officer should have to come forward with specific information about
why the omitted information was not provided or why the false
statement was included, and the reviewing court would have to
determine that the officer's conduct did not even show recklessness.
Furthermore, the officer should have to bear the burden of proving that
probable cause exists without regard to the Franks error.
Even under this revised formulation of Franks, the police should

383. This approach is modeled on Professor Griffin's analogous suggestions regarding
modifying the burden of proof for Brady disclosures depending on use of a checklist. See Griffin,
supra note 339, at 999-1000 (justifying burden shifting based on clarity of disclosure obligations).
384. See Colkley, 899 F.2d at 301 (discussing the standards for what defendants must prove
for Franks omissions challenges). See also Griffin, supra note 339, at 1000 (arguing that the burden
in Brady cases should stay on the defense when information was not called for in the proposed
checklist).
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still have adequate incentive to get search warrants in cases based on
informant information. After all, obtaining a search warrant provides
significant evidence that qualified immunity should attach to officers
facing civil suits over allegedly unlawful searches.385 Furthermore,
empirical evidence provides some support for the idea that getting a
search warrant may help prevent later suppression of the evidence
seized.386 Empirical evidence also provides at least some support for the
idea that search warrant usage has increased, at least in some types of
Additionally, technological
cases and in some circumstances. 3 87
advances have made it easier than ever for officers to obtain warrants.
Therefore, the additional "burden" of completing a checklist while
preparing the application should be minimal, and the checklist may
actually make warrant applications easier to complete, as they provide
clear directions about what types of information should be included.
Furthermore, although the defendant would now more easily be able to
challenge the validity of search warrants, police should have an easier
time in knowing what information should be provided because of the
checklist, and the revised test described above does not impose on police
a duty to do additional investigation. The magistrate would still be
asked to make a common-sense determination about the existence of
probable cause, 389 and the modifications to the test still leave ample
room for the reviewing court to uphold the adequacy of the search
385. Messerschmidt v. Millender, 132 S. Ct. 1235 (2012).
386. See, e.g., Uchida & Bynam, supra note 15, at 1064 (discussing findings of several studies
showing that the exclusionary rule very rarely leads to "lost cases"). This empirical evidence is not
definitive, as it does not demonstrate the effect of getting a warrant versus proceeding without a
warrant on the same facts. Even without evidence of that comparison, however, the existing
evidence suggests that at least in some cases, seeking a warrant helps police officers make better
decisions about their investigations. See id. at 1065-66 (discussing the incentive that the
exclusionary rule provides in helping ensure that police comply with the Fourth Amendment and the
efforts of police officers to improve warrant applications in order to comply with the law and
preserve admission of evidence obtained).
387. See, e.g., Jonathan Witmer-Rich, Covert, Delayed Notice Searching: A Constitutional
and Policy Failure-and a Solution (work-in progress on file with author, discussing vast expansion
of delayed notice covert search warrants, including in routine federal criminal investigations);
Uchida & Bynam, supra note 15, at 1034 (discussing increased use of search warrants in state
courts, particularly in drug cases, during the late 1980s).
388. See, e.g., Bar-Gill & Friedman, supra note 14, at 1672 (discussing various techniques to
improve access to warrants, including increased use of telephonic warrants, use of Skype to
facilitate judicial authorization of blood-draws from DUI suspects, and even judges being present at
DUI checkpoints to issue warrants).
389. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230, 239 (1983). This proposal is not inconsistent
with Gates' flexible approach because it does not impose any particular formal requirements, either
on police about what evidence they must uncover or magistrates regarding how they must assess
probable cause.
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warrant. This article also echoes the call from other scholars to
reinvigorate the warrant requirement and minimize reliance on
exceptions, 39 0 although these proposals do not depend on that change.
These changes would, admittedly, lead to more suppression of
evidence for violations of Franks. From the perspective of the cognitive
bias research, however, the highly visible nature of suppression has
several benefits. For example, suppression of evidence in some cases
should help mitigate overconfidence bias in police, helping them make
better predictions about the likelihood of their illegal conduct being
detected and punished, which should in turn deter some unlawful
searches. 3 9 1 Professor LaFave notes the importance of deterrence as a
justification for the exclusionary rule, as well as its appropriateness in
Franks cases where the officers. have misled the magistrate who issued a
search warrant.3 9 2 Similarly, Professor Taslitz notes the error-reduction
that is likely to result from suppression incentivizing officers to do
investigations that are more thorough in the first place. 3 93 And that is the
real goal of the reforms suggested in this article - not increased
suppression of evidence seized, but improved search warrant
applications in the first place.394
That goal is consistent with
exclusionary rule studies suggesting that it incentivizes better police
decision-making without resulting in significant numbers of "lost cases"
due to suppression of the evidence. 3 9 5

390. See, e.g., Bar-Gill & Friedman, supra note 14.
391. Lammon, supra note 165, at 1137-38. See also id. at 1139 ("when we reject the
assumption that police officers (or anyone else for that matter) are able to accurately calculate the
costs and benefits of their conduct, and instead acknowledge that police systematically deviate from
rational behavior, the force of exclusion becomes evident."). See also Bar-Gill & Friedman, supra
note 14, at 1614 ("In a sense, a firm warrant requirement makes the Fourth Amendment selfenforcing; its clear enforcement ex post will serve to deter Fourth Amendment violations ex ante by
optimizing police conduct.").
392. LAFAVE, supra note 34, at Sec. 4.4, just after note 19.
393. Taslitz, Police Are People Too, supra note 29, at 65. As noted above, I am not arguing
for an expanded duty to investigate, but use of the checklist should help officers think about their
investigations more consistently and effectively.
394. To the extent that officers are engaging in deliberate wrongdoing rather than just falling
victim to cognitive biases, use of the checklist should help make it harder for them to fabricate
informants, and it would make it easier for defense counsel to challenge fabricated information
through subsequent litigation. See notes 94-96 (regarding the danger of police making fabricating
the existence of informants); 369 (regarding testifying).
395. See Uchida & Bynam, supra note 15, at 1064-66 (discussing the conclusions to their
study, which were consistent with previous studies showing limited numbers of "lost cases" due to
the exclusionary rule).
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3. Cautious Reliance on Corroboration
Many scholars have suggested that increased use of corroboration is
an important part of the solution to the problems of informant
unreliability and incentives to lie.396 They argue that given the
incentives for informants to tailor their stories to match the police or
prosecutor's theory of the case, the courts should weight more heavily
corroboration of the informant's story.397 At least one study suggests
that police frequently seek corroboration of informant tips, 398 and the
courts often rely heavily on corroboration when rejecting Franks
challenges.399 But increased reliance on corroboration is somewhat
problematic.
First, confirmation bias makes it hard to evaluate the appropriate
weight of corroboratory evidence, in that confirmation bias both leads to
overvaluing of details that are not really significant and undervaluing
disconfirmatory evidence. That is perhaps why the case law on
corroboration has been particularly problematic. 4 00 In some high-profile
cases, and probably other cases that are not so high profile, courts
thought that informants' tips were corroborated, only to discover that the
corroboration was flawed.40 1
Second, and closely related, there is an inferential problem in
relying on corroboration of innocent details to assume that the informant
must also be correct about claims regarding criminal activity. Professor
Erlinder correctly notes that "accurate predictions of legal conduct
reveal virtually nothing about the reliability or accuracy of allegations of
illegal conduct."4 0 2 Thus, for corroboration to be useful, it must confirm
not just general familiarity with the person being implicated, but more
specific information about criminal activity.
Third, that more specific type of corroboration is often unavailable.
Instead, informants' stories are hard to corroborate or contradict in cases

396. See, e.g., Zimmerman, supra note 56, at 141 (recommending that officers try to
corroborate all information from informants and avoid relying on informants in warrant applications
unless absolutely necessary).
397. See, e.g., Taslitz, Wrongly Accused Redux, supra note 18, at 1147 (arguing that
corroboration should be "one prerequisite for relying on an informant's tip.").
398. Benner & Samarkos, supra note 11, at 243.
399. See supra notes 225-229 and accompanying text.
400. See generally Erlinder,supra note 44 (detailing and extensively critiquing the evolution
of the Supreme Court precedent regarding use of corroboration to bolster informant tips).
401. See supra note 17.
402. Erlinder, supra note 44, at 3 (paraphrasing Justice Ginsburg's opinion in Florida v. J.L.,
529 U.S. 266, 271 (2000)).
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where their testimony is the central evidence against the defendant.4 03 In
other words, informants are "most needed when [they are] providing
otherwise unprovable facts, which thus cannot be corroborated."40 4
Prosecutors and police may thus offer leniency or otherwise incentivize
informant tips in precisely the cases where corroboration is unavailable,
increasing the risk that informant information will be false.405 Thus,
while corroboration can certainly be helpful, and while police should be
encouraged to corroborate informants' tips, courts need to be cautious
about relying too heavily on corroboration. And in cases where
corroboration is unavailable, courts should carefully scrutinize the
circumstances surrounding the informants' tip, to make sure those
circumstances suggest that the informant is credible.
V. CONCLUSION

Cognitive biases likely affect the search warrant process,
particularly when informants are involved, in several subtle but
important ways. Implicit bias may affect who becomes an informant and
who becomes a suspect for whom a search warrant is sought.
Investigative tunnel vision can exacerbate a premature focus on an
individual, affecting both what evidence is sought and how that evidence
is interpreted. Tunnel vision can also contribute to officers not
disclosing a complete picture of the investigation or of the informant's
reliability to the magistrate, undermining the magistrate's role in
providing a neutral evaluation of the basis for the search. Magistrates'
review of these applications can also be affected by framing, priming,
and implicit bias. When the resulting search turns up no evidence, the
situation is shielded from later review. When the search does turn up
evidence and criminal charges are filed, hindsight bias as well as
confirmation bias can affect judicial review of the evidence presented.
The current case law, both formally and as usually interpreted, fails to
provide a meaningful remedy.
These problems are complex, and some of the effects discussed
here are speculative; it would be helpful if more empirical research was
done to verify some of the conclusions I have drawn here. And the
search warrant process will always be affected to some extent by the
cognitive processes described above, particularly because search
warrants are issued ex parte. Nevertheless, the solutions described
403.
404.
405.

Natapoff, Beyond Unreliable,supranote 196, at 113.
Mosteller, supra note 28, at 551-52.
See id at 554.
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above should help improve decision-making in the search warrant
process. Full disclosure, in various forms, should help mitigate those
biases.
Increased education of magistrates, police, and judges can help
them approach the process with a somewhat different frame of mind.
Police should be encouraged to use a checklist of information about
informants that should be provided to the magistrate, both to help their
own case evaluations and to enable the magistrate to provide more
thorough and meaningful review. Those changes may mean that in
marginal cases, warrants are not sought or granted. It may also help
reduce the role of implicit bias in decisions to seek or grant warrants.
When warrants are issued, defense counsel should have some greater
room to challenge the warrants because of checklist usage and
corresponding changes to the Franks doctrine. Reviewing judges may
then be better able to resist confirmation and hindsight biases. These
reforms, adopted together, should help improve the process of decisionmaking without unduly hampering the ability of police to investigate
crime.
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APPENDIX A SAMPLE CHECKLIST FOR REQUIRED DISCLOSURES FOR
SEARCH WARRANT AFFIDAVITS BASED ON INFORMANT TIPS406

When a search warrant application includes information from one
or more informants, this checklist should be used to make sure the
magistrate is provided with sufficient information to evaluate the role of
that tip in contributing to the probable cause determination. This
information must be provided based on the knowledge of all officers
involved in the investigation in any way who have had contact with the
informant. When the checklist is used, there should be space included
for detailed information to be provided; that extra space has been
eliminated in this printing.
1.General information about the informant.
a. How informant came to attention of police officer.
b. Prior criminal record.
c. Current or former mental or physical impairment.
d. Pending or contemplated charges against the informant
(including known or suspected criminal activity by the
informant).
2. Information about informant's motives or benefits that may be
received for information.
a. Informant's relationship to the target of the warrant
application.
b. Was the informant involved in the criminal activity
under investigation?
c. Promises or offers of immunity or leniency for
informant's criminal activity (written or unwritten).
d. Monetary inducement.
e. Other benefits the informant might expect to receive.
3. Other information.
a. Who was present when informant provided information
to police?
b. Did the informant make any prior inconsistent
statements related to the criminal activity currently
under investigation, or recant the information provided
to police?
406. As noted above, this checklist could be used as drafted, or it could be used as a basis for
jurisdictions coming up with their own checklists for search warrants based on informant
information.
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Informant's track record of providing useful
information to police in the past (including arrests,
convictions, and previous information that turned out to
be inaccurate).
d. Any record of current or former mental or physical
impairment.
e. Any other information relevant to the informant's
credibility.
f. Race of the informant.
g. Race of the target of the investigation.
4.Information about corroboration.
a. What (if any) information provided by the informant
was successfully corroborated?
b. What (if any) information was attempted to be
corroborated, without success?
c. What (if any) information provided by the informant
was shown to be inaccurate by subsequent
investigation?
d. Was any of the informant's information contradicted by
scientific tests?
c.

